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[[N]et metering disputes are] one indication that this is
“revolution now.” 1
–U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz
I. RING-FENCING POWER
The second most important invention of all time.2 Several hundred
billion dollars of annual transactions.3 New law, government deregulation,
legal ‘ring-fences,’ winners and losers. These are the stage directions in
a significant legal drama now unfolding over a law altering the most im-
portant 21st century technology. A barrage of legal suits is challenging
a new regulatory metric, and state governments are being held to have
acted unconstitutionally. This Article explores each point of the regulatory
change and increasing legal friction.
The second most important invention of all time: Electricity is
identified as the second most important invention in human history
1 Ker Than, As Solar Power Grows, Dispute Flares Over U.S. Utility Bills, NAT’L GEO-
GRAPHIC (Dec. 25, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2013/12/131226
-utilities-dispute-net-metering-for-solar/ [http://perma.cc/69DW-LJAY].
2 James Fallows, The Fifty Greatest Breakthroughs Since the Wheel, THE ATLANTIC, Nov.
2013, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/innovations-list
/309536/ [http://perma.cc/4CKA-V57L].
3 See Average Retail Price of Electricity to Ultimate Customers by End-Use Sector, PUB.
POLICY INST. OF N.Y. STATE, http://ppinys.org/reports/jtf/2011/employ/average-retail-price
-of-electricity2010-11.htm [http://perma.cc/G4PR-ZWEE].
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other than the wheel.4 Having finished in second place among all inven-
tions, behind only the movable-type printing press, electricity is the only
invention in the rankings which also is indispensable to operate seven
other top fifty inventions of all time: the internet, computers, air condition-
ing, radio, television, the telephone, and semiconductors.5 This is a piv-
otal technology.
Electricity is not only essential in the modern American economy
but also of sweeping scope with a delivered transacted value in the U.S.
of approximately $375 billion annually.6 Electricity’s megafinancial value
exceeds the total amount of corporate income taxes collected in the U.S.7
Electricity is not static; its role is expanding: electronic books and messag-
ing, displayed only through electricity, are now significantly replacing the
use of the movable-type press, which was invented in China in 1041,8 and
occupies the only rung above electricity in the rating of the most important
inventions of all time.9 Nothing is more indispensable than electricity in
the foundation of the modern economy.
Deregulation: Electricity is the last regulated industry in the U.S.10
Approximately one-third of the U.S. states have chosen to increase power
competition and partially or fully deregulate retail power transactions in
their states, reversing the traditional utility monopoly position.11 Restruc-
turing and deregulation of the retail electric power sector, commencing
at the state level in 1997, dramatically changed the regulatory paradigm.12
4 Fallows, supra note 2.
5 Id.
6 The average delivered price of all electricity nationwide in 2011 was $0.0966/kWh, and
$0.1109/kWh for residential customers. See PUB. POL’Y INST. OF N.Y. STATE, supra note 3.
7 Historical Amount of Revenue by Source, TAX POL’Y CTR., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org
/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=203 [http://perma.cc/NQQ4-MUP3].
8 See ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/477017/printing
/36836/The-invention-of-typography-Gutenberg-1450 [http://perma.cc/CU5B-B7AU]. After
this, movable print presses were invented in Korea and by Gutenberg in Europe in ap-
proximately 1450.
9 Fallows, supra note 2.
10 See STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET REGULATION, app.
A (2000).
11 Id.
12 See, e.g., id. at 149–50. About 40% of the states restructured prior to the electric sector
problems in California in 2000–2001, and thereafter further progress nationwide in this
direction was frustrated by the collapse of the California restructured power market in
2000–2001. See Steven Ferrey, Soft Paths, Hard Choices: Environmental Lessons in the
Aftermath of California’s Electric Deregulation Debacle, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 251, 252, 338
(2004). After, the other 60% of the states retained traditionally structured retail electric
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Today, thirteen deregulated plus seven partially deregulated states have
retail competition as shown in Figure 1.13
Figure 1
Legal Ring-Fences: Change has consequences. The resulting pres-
sure to now change the conventional utility model will implement policy to
ring-fence cash benefits for certain customers at the expense of others14:
• certain new use of the power distribution grid by
net-metering customers will continue at no cost to
sectors. See Steven Ferrey, Sale of Electricity, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY
AND RENEWABLES 218–19 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011).
13 Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia
.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html [http://perma.cc/R53Z-CN8G].
14 “Perhaps the most common function of ring-fencing is to protect a firm from becoming
subject to liabilities and other risks associated with bankruptcy. . . . Another function of
ring-fencing is to help ensure that a firm is able to operate on a standalone basis even if its
affiliated firms fail.” Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 73 (2014).
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the customer, which reduction in power sales will
reallocate those customers traditional portion of sys-
tem fixed costs to other customers who do not have
net metering;15
• premium feed-in tariffs paid for power from certain
customers at above-market rates and above feder-
ally prescribed “avoided cost,” shifts variable power
costs to other customers who do not generate their
own power;16
• renewable portfolio standards pay renewable energy
customers an additional bonus monetized credit/fee
for each kilowatt-hour generated, which cost corre-
spondingly is shifted to all other customers who pay
traditional rates;17
• utilities in ten states are required to purchase addi-
tional carbon credits for production, sale, or use of
traditional power supplies, which costs are shifted
to remaining customers.18
These new policies fundamentally change the traditional retail
utility role in transacting approximately $400 billion of consumer sales
each year.19 Proponents of this new model assert that it will diversify demo-
cratic and distributed sources of power and accelerate a transition to more
renewable resources, while changing the role of the utility from a monopoly
to a neutral facilitator.20 Critics counter that this will allow the more af-
fluent customers to step away from shouldering a fair proportion of the
cost of providing the second most important invention at the core of the
modern American economy.21 The model of the utility is changing.
New Regulation: Whichever perspective one takes, utilities are not
social welfare agencies or charities to redistribute assets from one group
of its consumers to another group of its consumers.22 Under long-standing
15 See infra Part III.A.2.
16 See infra Part III.A.1.
17 See infra Part III.B.1.
18 See infra Part III.B.3.
19 PUB. POLICY INST. OF N.Y. STATE, supra note 3.
20 See infra Part II.C.1.
21 See id.
22 See 12 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 34:195 (3d ed.
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law, utility rates must be designed and administered in order to recover
from the person to whom they are provided the cost of each unit of elec-
tricity and each related service provided.23 The legal obligation on state
retail electricity regulatory commissions is to fairly and equitably set and
administer retail rates based on the service provided. Public utility law
tracks the legal obligation to allocate costs and benefits of electricity ser-
vice in a manner that is “fair and equitable,” “not unduly preferential,”
“just and reasonable,” and “non-discriminatory” to each consumer.24
Different Winners and Losers: When fewer customers pay for the
distribution grid, or when a utility is compelled by state regulation to pay
more than market rate for power it is ordered to purchase from certain
customers, the transaction becomes a zero-sum proposition. While there
are significant benefits that flow from renewable power under the new
utility model,25 there are also costs.26 The utility, by law, does not absorb
these costs and losses from regulatory programs that it is mandated to
undertake. All of these costs and losses are passed on to the utility’s—
often captive—customers.27 There is no transparency or itemization of the
costs of net metering, FiTs, carbon credits, or RPS on the retail customers’
monthly bills, so that they do not see any of these separate costs trans-
ferred to them.
It is not just utilities that fear losing revenue in this new distrib-
uted generation model. State and local governments receive taxes em-
bedded invisibly in the typical utility bill of up to 25–40% of the bill
amount.28 As self-generation behind the meter or through-net-metering
2011); see also Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Harsch, 368 A.2d 1194, 1211–12 (R.I. 1977)
(quoting State ex rel. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 179 Wash.
461, 468 (1934)).
23 See infra Part V.A.
24 EPA’s Clean Power Plan: States’ Tools for Reducing Costs and Increasing Benefits to
Consumers, ANALYSIS GRP. (July 2014), available at http://www.analysisgroup.com
/uploadedFiles/Content/Insights/Publishing/Analysis_Group_EPA_Clean_Power_Plan
_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/7HK3-F8CR].
25 See infra Part II.C.2.
26 See infra Part II.C.2.
27 Tom Tiernan, Attention to Good Standby Rates Seen Key as Distributed Generation Plays
Bigger Role, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Dec. 31, 2012, at 10; Ralph Halper, Ralph Vartabedian & Julie
Cart, Taxpayers, Ratepayers Will Fund California Solar Plants, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 20,
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/20/local/la-me-bigsolar-20120921 [http://perma
.cc/FP8T-MW3W].
28 See RICKERSON ET AL., IEA-RETD, RESIDENTIAL PROSUMERS—DRIVERS AND POLICY
OPTIONS (RE-PROSUMERS) 40 tbl. 1 (June 2014), available at http://iea-retd.org/wp-content
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transactions absorb a larger share of power supply, power sales and gov-
ernment taxes that are directly linked to power distributed by the utility
decline commensurately.
No state has yet to carefully or adequately analyze these costs
against the benefits being imposed in order to determine tariffs and sub-
sidies. This Article examines the new administrative regulatory incentives
now applied to this second most important invention and indispensable
segment of the American economy. It assesses the new legal mechanisms
and analyzes the winners, losers, and legal ring-fences around the new
business model of energy.
Section II initiates the analysis by examining key legal aspects of
this second most important invention, its unique position compared to all
other things in commerce, and the significant legal transition now occur-
ring with power. Section III dissects the legal and regulatory mechanisms
deployed which affect the electric sector of the economy to facilitate change
and examines recent successful constitutional legal attacks against some
of this state energy regulation. Courts have stricken a significant part of
what states have tried.
Section IV navigates policy options for the new power model, and as-
sesses costs imposed and grid benefits which will now shift large amounts
of money among different groups of American power consumers. Section V
examines how the new models would be adjudicated under American reg-
ulatory law and precedent. We examine long-established principles of
American law that prohibit deliberate cross-subsidies among consumers.
Because no state has yet undertaken the required effort to quantify the
exact value of and costs to the grid of distributed renewable generation,
states risk legal challenges to setting rates and subsidies without accu-
rate valuation of the costs and benefits these rates reflect.
States will also see tax revenues to state government diminish
noticeably within the new regulatory model. This will create pressure to
recoup these lost revenues through higher tax rates for those consumers
still using the electric grid, exacerbating the shift of costs to those with-
out renewable power as renewable energy owners consume less central
power. To reconcile these significant impacts, Section VI constructs a solu-
tion to the controversy arising from new, changing administrative models
for power.
First, we look at how power is changing.
/uploads/2014/06/RE-PROSUMERS_IEA-RETD_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3NX-RW6E].
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II. POWER CHANGE
A. Revolution and Legal Responses to Technological Change
Things are changing with power. The use of electricity is continu-
ing to evolve, and the business of electricity is undergoing significant
change. Who produces it, from what sources, and how far it travels, are
all changing. This affects the role of the traditional, centralized utility as
the creator and purveyor of all power. A fundamentally disruptive cause
of alterations in the role of the U.S. utility is an accelerating increase in
the use of distributed solar energy, microgrids, on-site power, and other
consumer-generated energy sources.
1. The Power Base of the Revolution
The public continues to consume electricity. Three years ago, elec-
tric power had a delivered value in the U.S. of approximately $375 billion
annually,29 exceeding the total amount of corporate income taxes collected
in the U.S.30 Nonetheless, with a recent focus on climate change, there
is a change in the electric sector’s role and the societal impacts of power.
In 1949, only 11% of global warming gases in the United States came from
the electric sector; now, this sector is responsible for more than one-third
of such gasses.31 “The electric power sector offers the most cost-effective
opportunities to reduce CO2 emissions,” compared to transportation and
other sectors.32
Since humankind first created the wheel and harnessed animals
to do productive labor, energy has been the means to organize production
29 The average delivered price of all electricity nationwide in 2011 was $0.0966/kWh,
and $0.1109/kWh for residential customers. See PUB. POL’Y INST. OF N.Y. STATE, supra
note 3.
30 TAX POL’Y CTR., supra note 7.
31 See Historical Data Series: Total Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions by End-Use
Sector and the Electric Power Sector, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 1 (2007), http://www.eia
.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/excel/historical_co2.xls [http://perma.cc/LSN4-35YW].
32 Energy Estimates Show Rise in CO2 Emissions, Offer Mitigation Options, CLEAN ENERGY
REP. (July 2, 2008), http://cleanenergyreport.com/Energy-EW-Week/Energ-Washington
-Week-07/02/2008/energy-estimates-show-rise-in-co2-emissions-offer-mitigation-options
/menu-id-570.html.
2015] RING-FENCING THE POWER ENVELOPE 9
and advance civilization.33 The historic use of different energy sources
over the past four centuries is illustrated in Figure 2.34
Figure 2
Among the different sources of energy, electricity is a unique form
of energy—with no substitutes or alternatives to its use in the 21st cen-
tury for operation of computers, the Internet, medical imaging, national
defense and security, modern communication, and building size and cli-
mate control.35 Electric energy is the fundamental technology essential
33 STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER §§ 2:1, 2:5–6 (34th ed. 2014) [hereinafter
FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER].
34 Energy in the United States: 1635–2000: Energy Information Agency, MINNESOTANS FOR
SUSTAINABILITY (2003), http://www.mnforsustain.org/energy_in_the_united_states_1635
-2000.htm [http://perma.cc/ME9R-ENF9].
35 STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, 539–40 (6th ed.
2013) [hereinafter FERREY, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS]; see FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT
POWER, supra note 33, at § 2:1.10.
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to power the developed American economy.36 As the Supreme Court has
noted, it is now “possible for a customer in Vermont [to] purchase elec-
tricity from an environmentally friendly power producer in California or
a cogeneration facility in Oklahoma.”37 Since power is only usable when
delivered to users over a copper wire network, this movement and trans-
mission of power is the key connection.38
The high-voltage transmission network was recognized by engi-
neers as the “most important engineering feat of the 20th century.”39 In
terms of physical assets, the “grid” is composed not only of the approxi-
mately 4,800 interconnected power generation resources in the United
States, but also of the cable connecting them with consumers and the
hardware managing them in an energized instantaneous network.40 The
high-voltage transmission network at 230 kilovolts (“kv”) and higher com-
prises 167,000 miles of line in America.41 In the United States there is an
eastern interconnection, a western interconnection and a separate inter-
connection that includes most of Texas,42 as displayed in Figure 3.43 The
transmission system operates at fifteen different voltage levels,44 with
limited power transactions between these three major interconnections.
36 CRO FORUM, POWER BLACKOUT RISK 2 (2012), available at https://www.allianz.com/v
_1339677769000/media/responsibility/documents/position_paper_power_blackout_risks
.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF8S-9XFF].
37 New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 8 (2002) (quoting Transmission
Access Policy Grp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 225 F.3d 667, 681 (2000)).
38 For more on distributed generation options, see Steven Ferrey, Exit Strategy: State
Legal Discretion to Environmentally Sculpt the Deregulating Electric Environment, 26
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 116 (2002).
39 MASON WILLRICH, INDUS. PERFORMANCE CTR., ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION POLICY FOR
AMERICA: ENABLING A SMART GRID, END TO END 5 (2009), available at http://www.clean
lineenergy.com/sites/cleanline/media/resources/Electricity%20Transmission%20Policy
%20for%20America-%20Enabling%20a%20Smart%20Grid,%20End-to-End%20.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6W8S-7UWA].
40 Glossary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/glossary_e.htm
#electr_pow_grid [http://perma.cc/9NZX-ZEA9].
41 STAN MARK KAPLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION: BACK-
GROUND AND POLICY ISSUES 1–5 & n. 3 (2009) (discussing miles of transmission lines),
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/122949.pdf [http://perma.cc/3X79
-799L].
42 Id. at 3; see Figure 2 for a visual display of United States power system interconnections.
43 American National Electricity Grid, GLOB. ENERGY NETWORK INST., http://www.geni
.org/globalenergy/library/national_energy_grid/united-states-of-america/american
nationalelectricitygrid.shtml [http://perma.cc/WS6T-PTCX] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
44 Craig Cano, Efficiency Should Be Viewed as Key Part of Entire Delivery System,
Wellinghoff Says, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Dec. 13, 2010, at 18–19.
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Figure 3: U.S. Transmission Interconnections
2. Renewable Technology Economics Change
In the American economy, price matters. A big change is ushered
in through the technological and cost declines of wind and solar photovol-
taic (“PV”) distributed generation. There has been a radical change in the
cost of distributed generation.45 As a result of declining costs, “since 1999,
the Pacific Northwest has installed more than 7,000 megawatts (“MW”)
of additional wind generating capacity,”46 which is expected to increase
to 14,000 MW by 2020.47 The cost to install photovoltaic solar panels has
fallen dramatically by about 60% in “hard” costs.48
PV module prices have experienced a decline from about $1.90/watt
in 2009 to $0.70/watt, and lower in some regions of the world.49 Inverter
45 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 5.
46 Administrator’s Record of Decision P-1, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN. (Mar. 27, 2014),
available at http://www.bpa.gov/news/pubs/RecordsofDecision/rod-20140327-OS-14-Over
supply-Rate-Proceeding.pdf [http://perma.cc/9RU8-RTQ9].
47 Comments of the BPA in FERC Docket No. RM10-11-000 at 1 (April 12, 2010).
48 See generally LION HIRTH, NEON ENERGIEÖKONOMIK, THE MARKET VALUE OF SOLAR
POWER: IS PHOTOVOLTAICS COST-COMPETITIVE? (2014), available at https://www.mcc-berlin
.net/fileadmin/data/pdf/Publikationen/Hirth-2015-Market-Value-Solar-Power-Photovoltaics
-Cost-Competitive.pdf [https://perma.cc/4D7M-53TU].
49 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 9 (relying on Jade Jones, Regional PV Module
Pricing Dynamics: What You Need to Know, GREENTECHMEDIA (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www
12 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 40:1
prices, for the equipment necessary to convert photovoltaic direct current
to alternating current, have also declined by more than 60% in cost from
$0.60–$1.00+/watt in 2005 to under $0.20/watt in 2013.50 In the United
States, non-hardware “soft” costs for residential systems now account for
over 50% of total systems.51 This has allowed the solar photovoltaic
markets to grow at an average of more than 40% each year since 200052:
As a result of these trends, PV could act as a disruptive tech-
nology that challenges the incumbent players in its industry.
Many analysts have forecasted that the centralized utility
model that has served most of the world for over 100 years
could give way to new business operating paradigms.53
Since 2008, the price of photovoltaic panels has fallen by 75%, and
solar installations have multiplied by 1000%.54 The costs of renewable en-
ergy have declined significantly in recent years, there is distributed energy
competition to conventional power supply, and there is a push to make the
grid “smarter.”55 One additional rooftop solar system was being installed
every four minutes in 2013 in the United States.56 In the United States,
there were more than 300,000 “distributed” solar installations installed in
2012—almost all of which occurred in the forty-three net-metering states.57
.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/regional-pv-module-pricing-dynamics-what-you-need
-to-know [http://perma.cc/G7K9-BREZ]).
50 Id. (relying on Ian Clover, IHS Cuts Global Inverter Market Forecast in Face of Dramatic
Price Drops, PV MAG. (Oct. 16, 2013), http://m.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/ihs
-cuts-global-inverter-market-forecast-in-face-of-dramatic-price-drops_100013052/ [http://
perma.cc/39ZA-CP9Q]; NAVIGANT CONSULTING INC., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., A
REVIEW OF PV INVERTER TECHNOLOGY COST AND PERFORMANCE PROJECTIONS (2006)).
51 Costs are $3.34/watt in 2011 in the U.S., compared to $0.62/watt in Germany. RICKERSON
ET AL., supra note 28, at 72 (relying on Joachim Seel et al., Why Are Residential PV Prices
in Germany So Much Lower Than in the United States?, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB.
(2013)).
52 Id. at 10.
53 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 12.
54 Than, supra note 1.
55 The model is changing because bond ratings for IOUs are lower now. Ronald Lehr, New
Utility Business Models: Utility and Regulatory Models for the New Era, 26 ELEC. J. 35,
40 (2013).
56 Stephen Lacey, A Solar System Is Installed in the US Every 4 Minutes, GREENTECH
MEDIA (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/america-installs-a
-solar-system-every-four-minutes [http://perma.cc/YQ5P-DJDW].
57 Umair Ifran, Renewable Energy: Solar, utility companies clash over changes to net
metering, CLIMATEWIRE (Sep. 3, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059986606 [http://
perma.cc/6U7C-DVJK].
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Demand for rooftop solar paired with energy storage systems is predicted
to reach $1 billion in the U.S. within four years; approximately 318 MW of
solar-storage capacity will be in operation in the U.S. by 2018.58
Two-thirds of solar installations in California in 2013 were struc-
tured where the homeowner leased the panels, rather than where the
homeowner purchased them.59 Even with prices falling dramatically, the
amount of usable power that one can get out of a PV unit is also a func-
tion of latitude. Solar insolation ranges from 2.0–2.5 kWh/m2/day in
Scandinavia to as much as 6.5–7.0 kWh/m2/day in north-central Africa.60
Much of the innovation responsible for the solar industry’s explo-
sive growth has been financial rather than technological. Half the solar
capacity in the U.S., for instance, was installed just in 2012.61 Driving those
sales was the ability of homeowners to avoid the five-figure cost of a photo-
voltaic system by leasing it for a monthly payment that often was lower
than what they’d pay their local utility.62 Anywhere between 75 and 90%
of all solar systems are now leased as a result.63 Studies of technical po-
tential have found that rooftop PV could supply 20–40% or more of the
total national electricity demand in Europe and the United States.64
The sheer amount of solar is impressive, though the 8 gigawatts
(“GW”) of solar installed in the U.S. today is still less than 1% of U.S.
electricity production65 and less than 2–3% of the market in places where
58 Ehren Goossens, Solar With Batteries Market to Hit $1 Billion In U.S. by 2018, 46
ENV’T REP. 22 (2014).
59 Than, supra note 1.
60 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 27. A 1 kW PV system in Namibia achieves a
capacity factor of ~23% and produces about 2000 kWh per year, while a similar-size
system in Scandinavia operates at a capacity factor of half this value and produces half
as much power output.
61 Id. at 35.
62 Than, supra note 1.
63 Robert McIntosh, Americans & Australians May Disagree on Solar Leasing, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN INST. (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.cleantechnica.com/2014/08/21/americans
-australians-may-disagree-solar-leasing/ [http://perma.cc/6H52-PGFP].
64 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 35 (relying on A. Lopez et al., U.S. renewable energy
technical potentials: A GIS-based analysis, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab. (2012)); Maya
Chaudhari et al., PV Grid Connected Market Potential under a Cost Breakthrough Scenario,
NAVIGANT CONSULTING (2005); International Energy Agency, Photovoltaic Power Systems
Programme, Potential for building integrated photovoltaics—Achievable levels of electricity
from photovoltaic roofs and facades: Methodology, case studies, rules of thumb and deter-
mination of the potential of building integrated-photovoltaics for selected countries, Report
IEA-PVPS T7-4, 2002, at Summary; European Photovoltaic Indus. Ass’n & Greenpeace
Int’l, Solar generation 6: Solar photovoltaic electricity empowering the world (2011).
65 PETER KIND, EDISON ELEC. INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 4 (2013), available
14 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 40:1
the market is the most vibrant. An exception is Hawaii, which has a mar-
ket penetration of PV of approximately 7–10%.66
B. System Exodus Allowed by Law
The result of distributed generation and its distribution over micro-
grids is exodus, or partial exodus, of existing customers from the utility
grid. Grid exodus could become a viable option for residential systems in
Hawaii before 2020, in California by the early 2020s, and in New York
by the late 2020s; additional southern latitudes could begin to achieve
attractive internal rates of return around 2020.67 In Hawaii, the rapid rise
of distributed PV generation has already overloaded certain distribution
lines, resulting in restrictions on new solar PV projects.68
Economically viable and financeable microsolar renewable power
grid projects are only now just being implemented. Microgrids are still a
relatively rare premium product, employed for customers with a critical
need for high-quality reliable electricity to be used for national security,
public safety, disaster recovery, corporate risk management, and in those
remote locations either off the traditional grid or with reliability problems.69
Regulated utilities today are generally barred from providing solar
photovoltaic units behind the meter on the customers’ property to sell to
their own customers.70 Third-party ownership of residential PV systems has
been a dominant business model, with third-party ownership constituting
at http://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/Documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf [http://perma
.cc/EY5K-4U9U].
66 Eric Wesoff, Hawaii’s Utility is Approving a Backlog of More Than 3,000 Solar
Installations, GREENTECHMEDIA (Apr. 19, 2015), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles
/read/Hawaiis-Utility-is-Approving-a-Backlog-of-More-Than-3000-Solar-Installati [http://
perma.cc/WW69-NCE9]; DEP’T OF ENERGY, HIGH PENETRATION OF DISTRIBUTED SOLAR PV
GENERATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM HAWAII (2014), available at http://www.energy
.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/12/f19/1-Champley-DEPresentation-Sep2014.pdf [http://perma
.cc/46D8-285M].
67 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 18.
68 Id. at 52.
69 See generally ROBERT LIAM DOHN, SIEMENS, THE BUSINESS CASE FOR MICROGRIDS: THE
NEW FACE OF ENERGY MODERNIZATION (2011), available at http://w3.usa.siemens.com
/smartgrid/us/en/microgrid/Documents/The%20business%20case%20for%20microgrids
_Siemens%20white%20paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/33WR-FLY8]; Microgrid Activities, DEP’T
OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/oe/services/technology-development/smart-grid/role-micro
grids-helping-advance-nation-s-energy-syst-0 [http://perma.cc/4GWV-973R] (last visited
Oct. 26, 2015).
70 See generally ELEC. ENERGY MARKET COMPETITION TASK FORCE, infra note 181.
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more than 60% of all residential PV ownership in California, Arizona,
and Massachusetts.71
Utilities now do not earn a profit on PV distributed generation
that others own.72 Some utilities propose that they be allowed to recover
through rate-base solar on customer rooftops—which very few states now
permit.73 Certain utilities are going into solar as a separate unregulated
business venture: Dominion Energy recently announced it is divesting its
retail business and that it plans to double down on solar with a 250 MW
development target by 2016.74 The New York Public Service Commission
(“PSC”) is proceeding with a regulatory proceeding to reform the state’s
energy industry and regulatory practices.75
C. New Industry Architecture
1. What, Where, When
Foreshadowed is a significant change in energy’s economic archi-
tecture. Many recent articles discuss the utility business model and how it
is changing, and even must change.76 Some people in the power industry
71 GTM RESEARCH & SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASSOC., U.S. SOLAR MARKET INSIGHT
REPORT: Q2 2013 (2013), available at http://www.greentechmedia.com/research/ussmi
[http://perma.cc/E726-KAH3].
72 See generally Chuck Ross, The Energy-Generation Puzzle: What Is The Value Of Roof-
top Solar, ELEC. CONTRACTOR (Dec. 2014), http://www.ecmag.com/section/green-building
/energy-generation-puzzle [http://perma.cc/XAA3-GXXZ].
73 James Tong & Jon Wellinghoff, Should utilities be allowed to rate base solar? Should
we even be asking this question?, UTILITY DIVE (May 11, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com
/news/tong-wellinghoff-should-utilities-be-allowed-to-rate-base-solar/396283/ [http://perma
.cc/DX5Z-ZVUS].
74 Zacks Equity Research, Dominion Multiplies Solar Projects, ZACKS INV. RESEARCH
(Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/128536/Dominion-Multiplies-Solar-Projects
[http://perma.cc/K863-8X4T].
75 NYS DEP’T OF PUBLIC SERV., REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION 46 (2014), available at
http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/96f0fec0b45a3c6485257688006a701a/26be8a9
3967e604785257cc40066b91a/$FILE/ATTK0J3L.pdf/Reforming%20The%20Energy
%20Vision%20(REV)%20REPORT%204.25.%2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/RTC6-MMA4].
76 See generally Lehr, supra note 55; Fereidoon P. Sioshansi, Business Not as Usual: Fine-
Tuning Utility Model Won’t Do, 27 ELEC. J. 1, 4–5 (2014); Fereidoon P. Sioshansi, Why
the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business Model, 25 ELEC. J. 65, 65–74 (2012);
Tom Tiernan & Herman Wang, Utility Business Model at ‘Inflection Point’ as Technology,
Smart Grid Change the Game, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Oct. 8, 2012; John Downey, Technology
Will Change Utility Business Model, Duke Energy Exec Says, ENERGY INC. (July 15, 2014,
3:55 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/blog/energy/2014/07/technology-will-change
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think a transition to the use of decentralized microgrids could be revolu-
tionary.77 There is a concern that these changes could usher in a new
industry architecture, ultimately supplanting the centralized utility grid
with a new decentralized, cellular topology.78 While such a topology is of
particular value in developing countries where the centralized grid does
not stretch to all consumers, its future impact in the U.S. is still un-
known.79 Adam Browning, executive director of the nonprofit Vote Solar
Initiative, stated:
What we’re looking at here is a total potential transforma-
tion of the energy business. There’s a regulatory compact
that gives utilities a monopoly to serve the public good. The
public good is a renewable future, and either they adapt to
these new realities, or they’ll go the way of the dinosaurs.80
Some commentators forecast that utilities could become more like phone
companies now in a new era of total competition.81 However, there are im-
portant distinctions: there will remain only one set of utility transmission
and distribution lines, unlike what we have now with multiple pole attach-
ments of different phone and cable service lines, and wireless phone tech-
nology.82 The distribution technology for power will remain monopolized,
and that distribution grid is the most critical component of electricity.
Amid these new pressures, business models must evolve to meet
the challenge posed by climate change.83 The model will change because
the fabric of electricity will be composed of more bulk power generation
-utility-business-model-duke.html [http://perma.cc/P4TB-YCJK]; Davide Savenije, How
New Market Entrants Are Upending the Utility Business Model, UTILITY DIVE (May 12,
2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-new-market-entrants-are-upending-the-utility
-business-model/261442 [http://perma.cc/Y5SX-QTFW]; Kevin Wedman et al., The Big
Question: What Is the Future Utility Business Model?, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM
(Dec. 25, 2013), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/print/volume-16/issue-6
/solar-energy/the-big-question-what-is-the-future-utility-business-model.html [http://perma
.cc/9TX4-94ZD].
77 Than, supra note 1.
78 Michael Burr, Microgrid Milestones, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY (Dec. 19, 2013), http://
spark.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/microgrid-milestones [http://perma.cc/UT8M-J5MT].
79 Id.
80 Than, supra note 1.
81 Lehr, supra note 55, at 40.
82 For more on pole attachment, see FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 33,
at § 10:3.
83 Lehr, supra note 55, at 35.
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and movement and more distributed generation.84 The traditional business
model for regulated utilities was to sell kilowatt-hours of power. Now a
broader range of services must be provided by utilities when they no longer
have a monopoly on the supply of power, while managing the electric field
carried through wires in America.85
Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institute claims that chang-
ing the role of a utility is essentially “turning the utility inside out.”86
Under a decoupled system, utilities become energy-services providers,
with energy efficiency being one facet of their service, and not being only
merchants of electrons for power.87 There is a prediction that the new
utility business model will focus on “outputs” rather than “inputs” in util-
ity regulation, although the devil is in the details.88
Some forecast that under new business models, utilities would be-
come neutral managers of grid infrastructure, brokers of new customer
relationships, partners with service providers, or financiers of infrastruc-
ture.89 A study for the International Energy Agency (“IEA”) forecasts a
new era of “prosumers,”90 who will develop their own PV solar power on-
site, with a resulting decentralization of electric supply internationally
to “evolutionize the utility sector just as personal computers and cell
phones changed their respective industries.”91
With substantial on-site generation, utilities will earn less profit on
the generation and supply components of electricity. This utility revenue
84 Id. at 37.
85 See infra Part IV.A.
86 Katherine Ling, Rising Temps Melt Electric Utilities’ Business Models, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/09/10/10greenwire-rising-temps-melt
-electric-utilities-business-72148.html [http://perma.cc/T6WF-B2HM].
87 See id. (quoting David Owens, Executive Vice President of Business Operations at the
Edison Electric Institute: “The utility will not be a passive entity as it is today. . . . Folks
believe a utility exists to sell kilowatt-hours; that is not going to be the model of the future.
The model of the future is ‘Let me look at how I can improve efficiency, how I can reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.’ That is what the utility is going to be focused on.”).
88 Lehr, supra note 55, at 50. Inputs are easily quantifiable in the form of costs of utility
operation; outputs are more subjective elements.
89 See, e.g., L. BIRD ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXPANDED ADOPTION OF DISTRIBUTED SOLAR (2013), available at http://
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/60613.pdf [https://perma.cc/45WM-CAS2]; JAMES NEWCOMB ET
AL., ELEC. INNOVATION LAB., NEW BUSINESS MODELS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION EDGE 15 (2013).
90 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 13 (“Some studies have also recently suggested
that a more robust definition of electricity prosumers would also incorporate elements such
as the ability to react to dynamic pricing, the use of demand response, and integration with
smart grid infrastructure.”).
91 Id.
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erosion affects utility credit quality, increasing its cost of attracting needed
capital and system investments. Amid this ongoing evolution of the indus-
try, Tong and Wellinghoff write that current regulations leave the utilities
with only two business strategies: (1) “. . . do nothing and lose their best
customers,” or (2) “ ‘compete’ against solar by making it less attractive.”92
Most utilities are not against solar as a power generation technol-
ogy, but are concerned with their grids being used for decentralized dis-
tribution power facilitation, which reduces the utility role as generators
of power.93 There is also concern about how a partial or total exodus from
the grid by those with distributed generation undercuts the current utility
business model. There are large fixed infrastructure costs for generation,
transmission, and distribution networks.
Electricity consumers typically are charged for electric service as
a variable function of the quantity of power purchased rather than through
fixed costs.94 With an exodus of customers, fixed utility grid costs are al-
located over a smaller volume of retail sales to remaining customers, in-
creasing costs for each unit of power.95 This revenue erosion affects utility
credit quality, increasing its cost of attracting needed capital for system
investments and increasing the total costs of the system.
2. Distributed Generation—Netting Costs and Benefits
Under the current utility system, the motivation for self-generation
is, in significant part, regulatory cost avoidance. While self-generation of
power from smaller fossil-fired units typically is more expensive and has
greater environmental impacts per kWh generated compared to similar-
fuel larger units, distributed generation achieves avoidances of imposed
regulatory costs:
• The generator avoids all transmission, distribution,
system benefit charge, and tax costs in the retail bill
92 James Tong & Jon Wellinghoff, Rooftop Parity, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2014/08/rooftop-parity?page=0%2C1&authkey
=694f9b6d88b73bb34af7a1dfe32592897cf7300b810bfb7d7d2030eab37ffed0 [http://perma
.cc/U29B-KCGV].
93 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 48.
94 Id.
95 Jeff McMahon, Steven Chu Solves Utility Companies’ Death Spiral, FORBES (Mar. 21,
2014), http://onforb.es/1iK959N [http://perma.cc/4453-AP8F]; Herman K. Trabish, California
PUC President: The Utility Death Spiral Is ‘Last Year’s Hype,’ GREENTECHMEDIA (Jan. 29,
2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/The-Utility-Death-Spiral-is-Last-Years
-Hype-California-PUC-President [http://perma.cc/KTN2-H8WD].
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for the amount generated, which avoided fractions
collectively typically constitute as much as up to
half, and in some cases more, of the retail bill.96
• The generator can receive a suite of cross-subsidies
in the form of RECs, net-metering credit value, sys-
tem benefit charges, carbon credits; in Massachu-
setts, as one example, these are collectively worth
up to 1000% more than the value of power pro-
duced itself.97
a. Renewable Power Benefits to the Grid
Distributed generation creates benefits for the larger energy sys-
tem: generating power on-site avoids energy loss experience by power
traveling over the transmission and distribution grid and can defer costs
otherwise necessary for distribution and transmission capacity upgrade
modifications.98 A value-of-solar tariff has previously been developed by
the municipal utility in Austin, Texas, for residential PV.99 Additional
deployment of renewable energy resources has measurable significant
positive public externalities:
• increasing power system reliability with more in-
dependent points of generation;100
• creating a reliable and appropriately more-mixed
generation supply diversity for the electric power
system;101
• putting less pressure on the use of the aging power
distribution system by utilizing on-site private power
96 See JIM KENNERLY ET AL., RETHINKING STANDBY & FIXED COST CHARGES 37 (NC Clean
Energy Technology Center 2014), http://www.solaroutreach.org/wp-content/uploads/2014
/08/Rethinking-standby-and-Fixed-Cost-charges_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/8RN4-Z2N8].
97 See MASSACHUSETTS NET METERING AND SOLAR TASK FORCE, SOLAR INCENTIVE POLICY
SUMMARIES 3, http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/task-1-report.pdf [http://
perma.cc/T263-JML6].
98 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 44. Most countries in North America and Europe
experience T&D losses of 4–8%. Id.
99 Karl Rábago, Designing Austin Energy’s Solar Tariff Using A Distributed PV Value
Calculator, CLEAN POWER RESEARCH, 1 (2012), http://www.cleanpower.com/wp-content
/uploads/090_DesigningAustinEnergysSolarTariff.pdf [http://perma.cc/5K3N-24LW].
100 See Distributed Energy Basics, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABS (July 6, 2013, 7:37 PM),
http://www.democraticunderground.com/112748526 [http://perma.cc/6BKA-BCAL].
101 Id.
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rather than moving more power through the regu-
lated power distribution system;102
• using solar photovoltaic (“PV”) systems that can add
on-peak value to the power transmission network
with which they interconnect by providing supply to
proximately located end users,103 although this is
dependent on a case-by-case locational determina-
tion of power flow.104
Some scholars have estimated that the value of distributed solar
PV units that sell power back to the grid results in savings to the utility
system.105 This is due to not purchasing that amount of power elsewhere,
saving use of transmission and distribution capacity, eliminating risk of
changes in fossil fuel prices, and saving transmission and distribution
losses of 5% to 10% in transmission, which they valued cumulatively at
between $0.09 and $0.25 per kWh.106 In addition to these values to the
utility system, articles note that there are other societal, environmental,
and health benefits, jobs, and grid security, which increase the cumula-
tive total by an estimated 50%.107
b. Grid Costs
Financial incentives can cause renewable energy to be implemented
at “light speed.” Massachusetts’s RPS carve-out was originally designed in
2012 to try to reach 250 Mw of solar photovoltaic technology installations
102 See Steve Ehrlich, Transforming into the Digital Utility: Six Steps to Implementing
Effective Asset Analytics, ENERGY CENTRAL (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.energycentral.com
/utilitybusiness/riskandoperations/articles/3010/Transforming-into-the-Digital-Utility
-Six-Steps-to-Implementing-Effective-Asset-Analytics/ [http://perma.cc/M28W-GD3S].
103 Edward Kahn, Avoidable Transmission Cost Is a Substantial Benefit of Solar PV, 21
ELEC. J. 41, 45 (2008).
104 While increased solar PV installations sited near load centers can defer substation and
grid system investments, they can increase two-way power flows and add grid management
costs for voltage fluctuations and equipment overload. Tiernan, supra note 27, at 10.
105 Richard Perez et al., Solar Power Generation in the U.S.: Too Expensive, or a Bargain?,
39 ENERGY POL’Y 7290, 7294 (2011). The range of value that this Article attaches to whole-
sale power is significantly above the average weighted price of wholesale power trans-
actions in the last several years, and uses the distributed power value in New York City,
a location that is capacity constrained. See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra
note 33, at § 10:144 n.29.
106 Id.
107 Perez et al., supra note 105, at 7293.
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by 2017.108 400 Mw were successfully implemented by 2013, with generous
Massachusetts incentives.109 The state argues that “[t]he mechanism does
not burden the Commonwealth with financial liability.”110 While financial
incentives might not burden the Commonwealth as a directly paying party,
it is not without a cost that must be paid. The subsidies must be funded
from some source. These utility-administered subsidies come from rate-
payers, rather than the tax base.111
Once a state quantifies that positive or negative benefit of any
particular distributed generation for the system, those benefits and costs
should be reflected in system costs paid by ratepayers. There are real costs
associated with necessarily greater amounts of spinning reserve, ramping-
up of fossil-fuel power to compensate for renewable intermittency, and
back-up power, which impose additional costs on maintenance for system
reliability that were not there before.112 The current practice in almost all
states has not been based on these key facts. Subsidies for distributed gen-
eration have been randomly provided in many states rather than based
on any quantification of net costs and benefits to the grid.113
The price impact of RPS-mandated renewable energy projects has
been estimated to range between a 0.1% increase in retail rates (in
Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York) to up to 1.1% retail rate
impact in Massachusetts.114 In the 2004 ruling by an Administrative Law
Judge of the New York Public Service Commission, it was concluded that
this renewable portfolio standard “would raise residential rates by 1.8%,
commercial by 2% and industrial by 2.4%.”115 It would cut statewide
108 Mark Del Franco, Massachusetts Revising SREC Program To Promote Healthy Solar
Growth, SOLAR INDUS. (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.solarindustrymag.com/e107_plugins
/content/content.php?content.13669 [http://perma.cc/K2MV-8M5B].
109 Renewable Energy in Massachusetts, AM. COUNCIL ON RENEWABLE ENERGY (June 2014),
http://www.acore.org/files/pdfs/states/Massachusetts.pdf [http://perma.cc/5FUR-Z8RX].
110 MASSACHUSETTS DEP’T OF ENERGY RESOURCES, MA RPS SOLAR CARVE-OUT PRICE
SUPPORT MECHANISM: PROGRAM DESIGN AND ANALYSIS DOCUMENT 1 (2009), http://www
.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/solar/ma-rps-solar-carve-out-price-support-mechanism
-design-document-102309-doer.pdf [http://perma.cc/5QNN-DZ9H]. The stated goal of the
Massachusetts RPS is to “require sufficient rate of return for end users, as well as project
investors . . . without the need for contracts with utility companies.” Id.
111 Halper et al., supra note 27.
112 See infra Part IV.B.
113 Halper et al., supra note 27.
114 Ryan Wiser et al., The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United
States, 20 ELEC. J. 8, 16 at Fig. 4 (2007) (demonstrating an impact of not more than
approximately one percent is forecast to be the cost of this implementation).
115 N.Y. ALJ Recommends Renewable Standard Reaching 25% by 2013, with Old Hydro,
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emissions of NOx by 6.8%, sulfur dioxide by 5.9%, and CO2 by 7.7%.
116 New
Jersey utility ratepayers already have paid $388 million in rebates and
other financial incentives for programs “to promote solar panels, wind
projects, and other renewable energy initiatives.”117 The New Jersey Divi-
sion of Rate Counsel head asked for a more transparent pricing scheme
for these incentives.118
Satisfying the California goal of having 33% of electricity supplied
by renewable resources by 2020 is estimated by the California PUC to
require the expenditure of approximately $115 billion.119 According to
PUC member, John Bohn, there should be more honesty about these
facts and costs.120 An article questioned the taxpayer and ratepayer sub-
sidies concealed within California’s push for a quick ramp-up of solar
energy generation:
Stanford University economist Frank Wolak, an expert in
the California electricity market, said the state’s renew-
able energy strategy could boost electricity rates 10% to
20%, depending on a number of factors. Potentially, con-
sumers’ bills could go up by 50%: ‘It is easily in the billions
of dollars,’ he said.121
California in late 2015 increased the requirement of 33% renew-
able power by 2020 to also include 50% renewable power use by 2050.
Even renewable-energy advocates, such as the Bay Area–based Climate
Policy Initiative, estimates:
ELEC. UTIL. WK., June 7, 2004, at 7. The ruling also envisions a trading system of renew-
able energy credits.
116 Id.
117 Tom Johnson, What Does It Really Cost Utility Customers to Subsidize Clean Energy?,
NEW JERSEY SPOTLIGHT (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/10/07/what
-does-it-really-cost-utility-customers-to-subsidize-clean-energy/ [http://perma.cc/D8Q7
-N4YC]. This does not include two more recent market-based solar programs funded by
subsidies on customer utility bills, which in 2012 raised $309 million. Id. “We don’t know
exactly what the cost is,” conceded New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel Director Stefanie
Brand, who has been a proponent of bringing more transparency to the process. “It’s good
for the public to know what they are paying.” Id.
118 Id.
119 Lisa Weinzimmer & Lynn Corum, California Challenge Looks Bigger and Bigger Among
Economic Woes, ELEC. UTIL. WK., January 18, 2010, at 1.
120 Id.
121 Halper et al., supra note 27.
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that 43 cents of every dollar of energy produced by the
Ivanpah facility will be paid for by taxpayers. . . . But out-
side experts, including Wolak, the Stanford economist, es-
timate that Ivanpah power is priced at $90 to $130 per
megawatt hour—three to four times the cost of electricity
in the state last year. . . . Powers estimated the cost of new
transmission lines to reach remote solar and wind power
plants could exceed $15 billion statewide in the next decade.
Upgrading existing transmission lines would add billions
more, he said.122
The California PUC Division of Ratepayer Advocates criticized the
rapid escalation in California ratepayer costs to achieve the RPS man-
date.123 The cost of RPS compliance exceeded the cost of the power
itself.124 The California Division of Ratepayer Advocates reported “that
the California Public Utilities Commission has ‘approved nearly every
renewable contract filed by the utilities, even when they rate poorly on
least-cost, best-fit criteria.’ ”125
The [California] PUC . . . has greenlighted all but two of
184 green-energy proposals since 2002 . . . . The state
Division of Ratepayer Advocates, whose purpose is to rep-
resent consumers, concluded in a report last year [2011]
that the power contracts the PUC has been approving have
put consumers on the hook for $6 billion in excess costs.
‘What the commission’s practice has been is not to consider
the cost of renewable power but to approve every renew-
able project that came before them,’ said Joe Como, acting
director of the division. ‘We really spent too much money.
It’s frustrating as hell.’126
One commentator has noted that “many advocates of alternative en-
ergy . . . heap acclaim on feed-in tariffs, with one observer declaring them
122 Id.
123 Geoffrey Craig, Renewable Costs of California’s Three Big Utilities Soared Last Year,
CPUC Data Shows, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Feb. 13, 2012, at 18.
124 Id.
125 California’s Coming Green-Outs: The Wind and Solar Mandate Means Future Power
Shortages, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788
7324582804578344500414630778 [http://perma.cc/RT6L-JVYW].
126 Halper et al., supra note 27.
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simply ‘fabulous.’ ”127 “The line of scholars, analysts, and advocates rush-
ing to say that feed-in tariffs are better [than other mechanisms] is not
a short one.”128 However, feed-in tariffs (“FiTs”) have not been seamless
in practice. Problems highlighted with FiTs have been:
• the longterm expense of FiTs;
• windfall profits realized by project developers;
• inequity between well-off citizens with distributed
generation compared to lower-income citizens.129
United States RPS state programs have been criticized as to the
invisible cost impact of RPS imposed on captive retail utility ratepayers.130
The California PUC Division of Ratepayer Advocates criticized the rapid
escalation in California ratepayer costs to achieve the state RPS man-
date;131 the cost of RPS compliance exceeded the cost of the power itself.132
Next, we examine RPS, net metering, and other regulatory tech-
niques that underlie and are essential components of the accelerating
change to a new model for distributing power.
III. MORPHING THE MODEL: DISTRIBUTED GENERATION INCENTIVES
PROVIDED BY UTILITIES UNDER STATE REGULATORY ORDER
The states have undertaken most renewable energy policy initia-
tives in the past two decades, sculpting sustainable energy policy around
five legal and policy initiatives:
• net metering (in 85% of states);
• renewable portfolio standards (in 65% of states);
• renewable System Benefit Charges (in 33% of
states);
• carbon and GHG regulation (in 20% of states);
• Feed-in Tariffs (in 10% of states).133
127 Lincoln Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-In Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 937,
939 (2014).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 941.
130 Tiernan, supra note 27, at 10.
131 Craig, supra note 123, at 18.
132 Id.
133 Steven Ferrey, Solving The Multimillion Dollar Constitutional Puzzle Surrounding
State “Sustainable” Energy Policy, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 122 at Table 1 (2014).
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Each of these can be a powerful stimulant to sustainable renew-
able energy deployment in a market economy. Each provides a financial
inflow at either the point of project construction or generation of renew-
able electric power. The state acts as a regulator and never owns the re-
newable power generation capital equipment nor itself transacts any sale
of the power produced. Each of these state measures torques the opera-
tion of the electric energy market through regulation. And it is this action
as a regulator, rather than a market participant, which raises constitu-
tional issues with discriminatory state renewable energy initiatives.134
A. State Electricity Incentives, Cross-Subsidies, and the
Supremacy Clause
1. Feed-in Tariffs
A FiT is a regulatory requirement imposed by some states on their
regulated utilities to purchase certain designated types of independent
power generation on a wholesale basis, typically from renewable resources
or combined heat and power (“CHP”) units, at prices well in excess of the
market value of wholesale power.135 The regulated utilities are forced to
“buy high” in terms of other electric power available in the market.136
FiTs administratively torque the operating power market in favor of the
sellers of certain state-designated renewable or CHP power, not adhering
to accepted rate-making methodology to minimize prudent utility-incurred
costs.137 Costs of a FiT are passed on to retail consumers by the utilities.138
Despite a series of lawsuits and accessible articles in both the tech-
nical and general press,139 advocates for renewable power are still urging
134 See FERREY, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 162–64 (examining the
market participant exception).
135 FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 33, at § 10:134.
136 Electric power in the Northeast has been available at an average price during the past
years of $0.05/kWh or less. See generally Electric Power Annual 2013, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf [http://perma.cc
/585L-CC92] (providing the annual statistics for each state’s average cost to the ultimate
consumer for electric power). The Vermont FiTs for power of this value were set for wind
of less than 15 kW at $0.20/kWh, for wind greater than 15 kW at $0.125/kWh, and for
solar generation at $0.30/kWh. Id.
137 FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 33, at § 5:9.
138 Id. § 10:134.
139 See Steven Ferrey, Chad Laurent & Cameron Ferrey, Fire and Ice: World Renewable
Energy and Carbon Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 125 (2010); Steven Ferrey, Chad Laurent & Cameron Ferrey, FiT
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states to adopt FiTs in the U.S., despite the fact that they are unconstitu-
tional when adopted at the state level:
Feed-in tariffs are the alternative to net-metering and their
time has come. FITs have been likened to PURPA on ste-
roids and they are as American as apple pie. It was a crude
feed-in tariff that launched renewable energy in California
during the early 1980s. In that program, you could connect
your biomass, wind, or solar plant to the grid, get paid a
fixed-price for ten years, and then get paid a floating price
for another twenty. And it worked—spectacularly.140
What is not mentioned is that the federal courts and FERC sepa-
rately struck such FiTs in California before those 20 years were up.141 After
having been scolded by both the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and FERC
in the mid-1990s,142 California tried the same already-stricken regulatory
action fifteen years later. After enacting a feed-in tariff requiring California
state utilities to make wholesale power purchases at well in excess of
wholesale rates for power and in excess of avoided costs, there was a chal-
lenge at the FERC as to whether this violated the Federal Power Act and
the Supremacy Clause of the United States’ Constitution.143 California
argued that its environmental purpose for regulation should make it ex-
empt from preemption in setting above-market wholesale feed-in renew-
able tariff rates for cogeneration facilities of less than 20 Mw and that
environmental costs could be considered to inflate avoided costs.144 The
affected utilities and others countered that federal law does not allow
in the U.S.A., PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY (June 2010); Steven Ferrey, Follow the Money!
Article I and Article VI Constitutional Barriers to Renewable Energy in the U.S. Future,
17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 89 (2012); Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: State Programs on Global
Warming and the Constitution, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835 (2009); Steven Ferrey, Shaping
American Power: Federal Preemption and Technological Change, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 47
(1991); Brian Potts, Regulating Greenhouse Gas “Leakage”: How California Can Evade
the Impending Constitutional Attacks, ELEC. J., 43–44 (2006) (“because of these two
Constitutional issues, courts are likely to strike down many or all of their proposals”).
140 Paul Gipe, Time to Break Free of Net-Metering; We Need a ‘FiT’ Policy for Renewable
Energy to Soar, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Dec. 26, 2013, http://energyblog.nationalgeographic
.com/2013/12/26/break-free-net-metering/ [https://perma.cc/manage/vest/9AWF-4MMH].
141 Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.
1994); S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 FERC ¶ 61,215 (1995).
142 Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, 36 F3d at 853; S. Cal. Edison Co. 70 FERC at 61,215.
143 In re Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2010).
144 Id.
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state regulation of wholesale sales to achieve state environmental goals,
that federal preemption cannot be avoided based on an environmental
purpose of the preempted state regulation, and that states may not under
the guise of environmental regulation adopt an economic regulation that
requires purchases of electricity at a wholesale price outside the frame-
work of the Federal Power Act, or if acting under PURPA, at a price that
exceeds avoided cost.145
FERC did not agree with state feed-in tariffs, and held that whole-
sale generators can receive no more than system-wide avoided cost for
power sales:
even if a QF has been exempted pursuant to the Commis-
sion’s regulations from the ratemaking provisions of the
Federal Power Act, a state still cannot impose a ratemaking
regime inconsistent with the requirements of PURPA and
this Commission’s regulations—i.e., a state cannot impose
rates in excess of avoided cost.146
When FERC rejected all of California’s arguments regarding generic envi-
ronmental rationales for wholesale rates in excess of limits under federal
law or as set by FERC,147 California made unsuccessful and somewhat
unusual assertions in its legal defense148:
• Past Constitutional principles in California prece-
dent no longer apply to it because California’s inno-
vative purpose was to target global warming;
• Ordering its utilities to offer to buy power at ille-
gally impermissible rates is not the same as order-
ing them to actually buy that power.
California was not successful arguing that it was regulating only
the buyers of power and not the sellers of power in the transaction.149 The
California Attorney General argued that mandating that regulated utilities
only “offer” to purchase wholesale power at substantially above wholesale
145 Id.
146 Id. ¶ 66.
147 Id.
148 See In re Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 133 FERC ¶ 61,059 (2010).
149 Teresa Morton & Jeffrey Peabody, Feed-in Tariffs: Misfits in the Federal and State
Regulatory Regime?, 23 ELEC. J. 17 (Oct. 2010).
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market rates is different from a requirement to actually “purchase” the
sold power.150 This argument was held unpersuasive by FERC.151 It held
that FERC’s authority under the Federal Power Act includes the exclu-
sive jurisdiction to regulate the rates, terms and conditions of sales for
resale of electric energy in interstate commerce.152
California argued that its environmentally beneficial purposes
should make it exempt from preemption in setting non-market-conform-
ing wholesale rates for a state FiT.153 FERC found state purpose to not
permit illegal establishment of FiTs requiring purchases of electricity at
inflated wholesale prices,154 and renewable wholesale generators could
receive no more than fair wholesale market prices under federal law.155
FERC reiterated that only the federal government can regulate com-
merce between the states, and California cannot attempt to regulate com-
merce outside its borders.156 California was preempted pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause.
2. Net Metering
Net metering is allowed in 43 U.S. states. How it operates is
straightforward technically, although somewhat controversial legally and
in terms of regulatory precedent regarding how rates are established. With
net metering, power passes in two, rather than one, direction(s) through
the retail power meter. As with conventional power supply, during times
when the retail customer needs additional electricity from the distribu-
tion utility, the meter runs forward conventionally. At other times, when
more electricity is produced from the customer’s distributed renewable
energy facility than is consumed by the customer, the excess is exported
to the electricity grid, running the meter in reverse direction.157 When
150 In re Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 133 FERC ¶ 61,059, 72 (2010).
151 Id.
152 16 U.S.C. §§ 824, 824(d), 824(e) (2006); see, e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex
rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988).
153 In re Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2010).
154 Id. ¶¶ 17–18. FERC rejected all of California’s arguments regarding generic environ-
mental rationales for wholesale rates in excess of limits under federal law or set by
FERC. Id.
155 In re Cal. Public Utils. Comm’n, 133 FERC ¶ 61,059, 72 (2010).
156 Id.
157 See Glossary, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://
www.dsireusa.org/support/glossary/ [http://perma.cc/DQ6L-ZWFE] (“When a customer’s
generation exceeds the customer’s use, electricity from the customer flows back to the
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turning the meter in reverse direction, the single rate at which the state
has the meter register affords a value at the full retail rate, which in-
cludes approximately half of the retail rate attributable to transmission,
distribution, and taxes.158
In essence, it receives for that power an amount that could be above
the utility’s avoided cost, and reflects distribution investments made by
the utility, not the QF. Net metering is not designed to be a fair price
based on rate-making law, it is a random price generally equal to the re-
tail price, which has no direct correspondence to the value of wholesale
power traded in the market. It adopts a retail price already determined
in other tariffs, but bearing no relationship to the wholesale markets in
which this power transaction actually occurs. It is wholly divorced from
rate-making principles, ignoring that the net-metering customer uses the
distribution grid twice (going and coming) and is assessed no fee, as if it
does not use the grid at all. Convenience of a numeric retail value exist-
ing, does not justify its use for different wholesale purposes.
Associated Industries of Massachusetts (“AIM”) voiced concern
about the Massachusetts plan to further green technologies, which it
claimed could cost billions for wind and solar power subsidies over just
one decade.159 AIM estimated that the cost could be $800 million annu-
ally, an increase of almost 30% in distribution charges.160 In addition, $10
billion of subsidies could be distributed to the sector according to AIM.161
Massachusetts had the third highest electric costs in the country prior
to any of these subsidies. Utility National Grid was already seeking dis-
tribution rate increases of 18% in 2009.162
If there were two meters to register the amount of power trans-
ferred in each direction to and from the electric grid, each could register
the appropriate value of power delivered to the customer and the value
grid, offsetting electricity consumed by the customer at a different time during the same
billing cycle.”).
158 See id. (“In effect, the customer uses excess generation to offset electricity that the cus-
tomer otherwise would have to purchase at the utility’s full retail rate.”). As to whether
electricity is a “good” or a “service” and how it should be treated under the law, see
FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra note 10, at 211–31 (2000).
159 Martin LaMonica, Cape Wind agrees to reduce cost of offshore wind, Aug. 2, 2010, avail-
able at http://perma.cc/8969-CAU7; and letter from Robert A. Rio, Senior Vice President
and Counsel, Associated Industries of Massachusetts, to Ms. Susan Leavitt, Department
of Energy Resources, available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/solar
/aim-robert-rio.pdf [http://perma.cc/N4NT-FAP4].
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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of power received from the customer. Net metering does not separately
apply to the actual value or correct rate to the power received by the grid
or reflect rate-making precedent.163 No two of the forty-three state net-
metering programs are identical. They differ in key factors of allowable
sizes of distributed renewable power generation units, the shelf life and
longevity of credits earned, the ability to monetize credits, eligible cus-
tomers, and technologies.164
The most distinct element of electricity often is overlooked: elec-
tricity, contrary to all other forms of energy, is not capable of being stored
efficiently as electricity is automatically converted to waste heat.165 The
amount of electricity supplied at each instant must match the load (the
demand for electricity) in the centralized utility grid or the electric sys-
tem shuts down or expensive equipment is damaged.166
Case precedent has permitted, but also potentially narrowed,
what net metering is within state legal authority. FERC determined in
MidAmerican167 that state net-metering programs were not preempted
by the Federal Power Act in that no sale occurs when net metering accounts
for less power export from the distributed energy customer to the grid than
the amount of power sold from the grid to the distributed generator.168 In
the subsequent Sun Edison169 precedent, FERC determined that the
Commission is not required by the Federal Power Act to exert jurisdic-
tion over the transfer of power if there is no net transfer of power to the
utility during a billing period.170 The direction of net power flow is the
163 Steven Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law: Power Navigates the Supremacy Clause, 24 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 267, 273 (2012); see also Glossary, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES
FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, supra note 157 (providing a definition of “net metering”).
164 See Rules, Regulations & Policies for Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES
FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/rrpre.cfm [http://
perma.cc/8DAY-7GBQ] (allowing users to click on each state’s net-metering policy to view
the specific rules and regulations of that policy) (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
165 See infra Part IV.B; see also FERREY, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 542
(describing inability to store electricity).
166 STEVEN FERREY, UNLOCKING THE GLOBAL WARMING TOOLBOX: KEY CHOICES FOR CARBON
RESTRICTION AND SEQUESTRATION 149 (2010) (describing how the electric system operates).
167 MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC ¶ 61,340 (2001).
168 Id. ¶¶ 62,261, 62,263. In March 2001, MidAmerican Energy Company challenged
before FERC the state of Iowa’s regulations directing MidAmerican to interconnect with
three “Alternate Energy facilities and to offer net billing arrangements to those facilities.”
Id. ¶ 62,261. MidAmerican also requested a declaratory order that federal law preempted
these regulations. Id. MidAmerican asked the commission to undertake enforcement action
against the Iowa Board or to issue a declaratory order that the final orders of the Iowa
Board are preempted by PURPA. Id.
169 Sun Edison L.L.C., 129 FERC ¶ 61,146 (2009).
170 Id. ¶ 61,620.
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critical variable: these precedents construed, and are predicated on, the
technical reality that there be no net export of electricity compared to the
purchase of power from the utility within a billing period.171 Both legal
decisions limited their legal findings only to a set of facts where there was
no net flow of power back to the power grid.
There was a challenge to net metering involving a wind generator
in Rhode Island in which virtually 100% of net power produced by the
distributed generator flowed back to the grid and was transferred to the
utility.172 The suit challenged whether the generator thus became an
independent wholesale generator which could be paid no more than the
avoided cost afforded to Qualifying Facilities under the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”).173 Instead, the net metered rate set
a value approximately 300% of the wholesale avoided cost value.174 The
Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers Advocacy Unit sup-
ported this complaint against the net-metering rule in Rhode Island.175
In response to the suit, the state altered key definitions in its state net-
metering law to allow the school which had the wind project to reallocate
its net-metering credits to several municipal accounts, which allowed dis-
missal of the suit.176
The Federal Power Act provides that FERC has “exclusive author-
ity to regulate the transmission and sale at wholesale of electric energy
in interstate commerce, without regard to the source of production.”177
Supreme Court precedent holds that Congress meant to draw a “bright
line,” easily ascertained and not requiring any fact-specific case-by-case
analysis or exceptions between state and federal jurisdiction.178 A federal
trial court decision, affirmed by the Second Circuit, ruled that state reg-
ulation of in-state wholesale power preferences and sales violated the
171 Id.
172 In re Complaint by Benjamin Riggs Relating to Net-metering at the Town of Portsmouth
Wind Generator Facility and Nat’l Grid–Electric, No. D-10-126 (R.I. Div. Pub. Util. &
Carriers Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://www.ripuc.org/eventsactions /docket/D-10-126
-Riggs-Portsmouth-Ord20510(10-13-11).pdf [http://perma.cc/92KX-4JJM] (report and order).
173 See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (2006) (explaining that Qualifying Facilities are exempt from
certain costs).
174 Memorandum from Benjamin C. Riggs, Jr. Objecting to and Commenting on National
Grid’s Tariff Advice Filing to Luly E. Massaro, Comm’n Clerk, R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n
(Aug. 2, 2011), available at http://www.ripuc.org/eventsactions/docket/4268-PublicComments
-Riggs(8-2-11).pdf [http://perma.cc/V7NS-BRQ5].
175 Portsmouth Net-metering, supra note 172, at 19–20.
176 Riggs Memorandum, supra note 174, at 1–2.
177 New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 340.
178 Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964).
32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 40:1
Federal Power Act and the U.S. Constitution.179 Under the Federal Power
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq.:
Congress has drawn a bright line between state and fed-
eral authority in the setting of wholesale rates and in the
regulation of agreements that affect wholesale rates. States
may not regulate in areas where FERC has properly exer-
cised its jurisdiction to determine just and reasonable
wholesale rates or to insure that agreements affecting
wholesale rates are reasonable. Miss. Power & Light Co. v.
Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 374 (1988). . . . [A] state
“must [. . .] give effect to Congress’ desire to give FERC ple-
nary authority over interstate wholesale rates, and to en-
sure that the States do not interfere with this authority.”
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953,
966 (1986). Under the “filed-rate doctrine,” state courts and
regulatory agencies are preempted by federal law from re-
quiring the payment of rates other than the federal filed
rate. See Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539
U.S. 39, 47 (2003) (“The filed rate doctrine requires ‘that
interstate power rates filed with FERC or fixed by FERC
must be given binding effect by state utility commissions
determining intrastate rates.’ ” (quoting Nantahala, 476
U.S. at 962)).”180
An increasingly larger majority of U.S. power now proceeds through
a wholesale power sale prior to its ultimate retail sale and disposition,181
thereby fundamentally altering the legal analysis of what is and is not
now jurisdictional for a state and the federal government to regulate.182
179 Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, L.L.C. v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 242–43 (D. Vt.
2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013).
180 Id. at 233 (second alteration in original) (parallel citations omitted).
181 “In the 1970s, vertically integrated utility companies (investor-owned, municipal, or coop-
erative utilities) controlled over 95% of the electric generation in the United States . . . by
2004 electric utilities owned less than 60% of electric generating capacity. Increasingly,
decisions affecting retail customers and electricity rates are split among federal, state,
and new private, regional entities.” ELEC. ENERGY MARKET COMPETITION TASK FORCE,
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC
ENERGY 10, available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/ene-pol-act/epact-final-rpt.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5SZY-N79U].
182 FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 33, at §§ 5-26 through 5-28; FERREY,
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 560–61.
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B. State Distributed Power Incentives and the Commerce Clause
1. State Renewable Portfolio Standards
A resource portfolio requirement requires certain electricity sellers
and buyers to maintain evidence of a predetermined percentage of desig-
nated clean resources in their wholesale electric supply mixes.183 Genera-
tors of PV power can make direct bilateral sales of their SRECs to retail
suppliers of power, which will have to purchase enough SRECs each year
to equal the required percentage of power generation set by the state.
RPS programs have been characterized as a form of ‘backdoor’ renewable
subsidies.184 Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have RPS.185
It is estimated that 45% of the 4300 MW of wind power installed in the
U.S. between 2001 and 2004 was motivated by state renewable portfolio
standards, while an additional 15% of these installations were motivated
by state renewable energy trust funds and subsidies.186 The current RPS
standards are projected to add 76,750 MW of additional renewable gen-
eration by 2025.187
Renewable Portfolio Standards in the 29 states vary significantly.
The state percentage of renewable energy delivered annually to consum-
ers from eligible renewable energy sources, the definition of which varies
in each state, ranges from a few percent to 40% of annual retail sales.188
183 The resources such as renewables, DSM, or high efficiency fossil combustion, as defined
by a particular state, would be included in the company’s overall resource portfolio. Portfolio
requirements can be applied to electricity sellers, such as generation companies and ver-
tically integrated utilities as a condition of continued market access. The requirements
could also be applied to wholesale electricity buyers, such as distribution companies and
electricity brokers, but the states do not exercise authority over wholesale markets.
184 Robert Glennon & Andrew M. Reeves, Solar Energy’s Cloudy Future, 1 ARIZ. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 93, 106 (2010).
185 See Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies: March 2013, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES
FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS
_map.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZH4F-F7HU].
186 Ryan Wiser & Mark Bollinger, Balancing Cost and Risk: The Treatment of Renewable
Energy in Western Utility Resource Plans, 19 ELEC. J. 48, 48 (2006).
187 Brad Plumer, The Biggest Fight Over Renewable Energy is Now in the States, WASH.
POST, Mar. 25, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/25/the
-biggest-fights-over-renewable-energy-are-now-happening-in-the-states/ [http://perma.cc
/YKA4-YMLV].
188 See Indiana: Incentives/Policies for Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES
FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program?state=IN
[http://perma.cc/G5PH-4LVG] (showing 4% as Indiana’s required state percentage of energy
delivered to consumers from eligible renewable sources); Hawaii Incentives/Policies for
Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY,
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So-called solar carve-out RPS requirements in eleven states and Wash-
ington, D.C., require solar power distributed generation percentages in
addition to other renewable power requirements.189 Massachusetts’ RPS
carve-out was originally designed to try to reach 250 MW of solar photo-
voltaic technology installation by 2017.190 Four hundred MW were achieved
by 2013, with generous Massachusetts incentives.
Several states also reward rebates to customers who install solar
systems.191 Non-compliance penalties vary in each state.192 The non-compli-
ance penalty can range from around $.06/kWh in California, Connecticut,
Washington, and Massachusetts, and lower amounts in other states (al-
though New Jersey and New Hampshire have equally high penalties for
non-compliance with Class I emissions).193
The cost of acquiring the required RECs is passed on to captive re-
tail power consumers.194 The California Public Utility Commission (“PUC”)
Division of Ratepayer Advocates criticized the rapid escalation in California
ratepayer costs to achieve the RPS mandate.195 The cost of RPS compli-
ance exceeded the cost of the power itself.196
A number of states have enacted RPS law which treats renewable
energy created in the state or immediate geographic region preferentially
to renewable energy generated in other states. This raises significant
constitutional issues.197 A number of states prohibit or disadvantage the
REC credit for out-of-state or out-of-region generation facilities.198 These
geographic program restrictions raise dormant commerce clause concerns
under the U.S. Constitution. There are a number of the twenty-nine states
http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program?state=HI [http://perma.cc/3R38-999G] (showing
40% as Hawaii’s required state percentage of energy delivered to consumers from eligible
renewable sources).
189 RYAN WISER & GALEN BARBOSE, RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS IN THE UNITED
STATES: A STATUS REPORT WITH DATA THROUGH 2007 16–20 (2008), http://eetd.lbl.gov
/sites/all/files/publications/report-lbnl-154e-revised.pdf [http://perma.cc/N7C9-TDWB].
190 Mark Del Franco, Massachusetts Revising SREC Program To Promote Healthy Solar
Growth, SOLAR INDUS. (Jan. 9, 2014), http://solarindustrymag.com/e107_plugins/content
/content.php?content.13669 [http://perma.cc/Q4C9-Y4K5].
191 K.S. CORY & B.J. SWEZEY, U.S. NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO
STANDARDS IN THE STATES: BALANCING GOALS AND IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS 11, Table 3
(Dec. 2007), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/41409.pdf [http://perma.cc/YD7Y-56KQ].
192 Id. at Table 5.
193 Id.
194 See Glennon & Reeves, supra note 184, at 108.
195 Craig, supra note 123, at 18.
196 Id.
197 See infra, at notes 206–12.
198 CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 191, at Table 2.
2015] RING-FENCING THE POWER ENVELOPE 35
with RPS that have incorporated credit multipliers, geographic restric-
tions, or preferences to promote in-state/in-region generation of power,
to the exclusion of external power, in the following percentages:
• Eight of the twenty-nine RPS states, or 27%, have
REC multipliers for in-state generation: Arizona,199
Colorado,200 Delaware,201 Maine,202 Michigan,203 Mis-
souri,204 Nevada,205 and Washington.206
• Four of the RPS states, or 14%, including two states
that also provide for a geographically discrimina-
tory REC multiplier, have either a requirement or
preference for in-state generation: California,207
Colorado,208 North Carolina,209 and Ohio.210
• Four of the twenty-nine RPS states, or 14%, give
program preferences to the use of in-state manufac-
tured products or in-state labor forces: Arizona,211
Delaware,212 Michigan,213 and Montana.214
• Eleven of the twenty-nine RPS states, representing
38% of RPS states, have a requirement for in-region,
rather than in-state, geographic location of genera-
tion to create RECs, including one of the states that
also has in-state multipliers and one with an in-state
199 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D)–(E) (2009).
200 COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(c)(V)(A)–(D), (c)(IX), (d) (2013).
201 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 356(a)(1), (d)–(e) (2012).
202 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, § 3605 (2010).
203 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 460.1039(1) (LexisNexis 2010).
204 MO. ANN. STAT. § 393.1030(1) (West 2013).
205 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704.7822 (LexisNexis 2011).
206 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 194-37-110(1)(c)(i)–(iii) (2008).
207 California Incentives/Policies for Renewables Efficiency, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES
FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://web.archive.org/web/20141031211359/http://www
.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=CA25R [http://perma.cc/6C97-R37T]
(explaining that a maximum of 25% of RPS compliance can be achieved through the use
of tradable renewable energy credits; therefore, the remainder of the RPS compliance
must be attained through in-state power sales).
208 COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(e)(II)–(III) (2013).
209 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-133.8(b)(2)(e) (West 2012).
210 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2012).
211 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D)–(E) (2007).
212 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 351(b)–(c) (2009).
213 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 460.1001(2)(a)–(d) (LexisNexis 2010).
214 MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2005(3)(a) (2013).
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preference: Connecticut,215 Illinois,216 Maine,217 Mary-
land,218 Massachusetts,219 New Hampshire,220 North
Carolina,221 Ohio,222 Oregon,223 Pennsylvania,224 and
Rhode Island.225
• Eleven of the twenty-nine states, or 38%, have an in-
state requirement for certain distributed power.226
• Four of the twenty-nine states, or 14%, have a bene-
fit for an in-state capital component or labor.227
• Some states have multiple multipliers and prefer-
ences.228
• Only seven of the twenty-nine states, or 24%, have
no geographic preferences in their laws.229
There has been litigation in several states, including New Jersey,
Maryland, Colorado, Missouri, Massachusetts, California, Vermont, and
elsewhere, contesting dormant Commerce Clause violations involved
with state energy/electric power regulation,230 including:
215 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-245a(b) (West 2013).
216 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3855/1-56(b) (West 2013).
217 65-407-311 ME. CODE R. § 6 (LexisNexis 2011).
218 MD. CODE REGS. 20.61.03(D) (2011).
219 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 25A, § 11F(a) (LexisNexis 2013).
220 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-F:6(I) (LexisNexis 2011).
221 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-133.8(b)(2)(e) (West 2012).
222 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(C)(5) (LexisNexis 2012).
223 OR. REV. STAT. § 469A.135(1)(a)(2) (2011).
224 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1648.4 (West 2008).
225 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26-4(d) (2012).
226 Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce Clause
Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 59,
75–77 (2012) (noting that resource eligibility in state RPS programs has expanded beyond
traditional renewables).
227 Steven Ferrey, Alternative Energy in a Spaghetti Western: Clint Eastwood Confronts
State Renewable Energy Policy, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 292 (2012) (listing Arizona,
Delaware, Michigan, and Montana as having this in-state benefit).
228 Id. at 291–92.
229 Id. at 292.
230 For an article concluding that the Maryland RPS program and others that similarly
facially discriminate against interstate commerce are likely unconstitutional in violation
of the dormant Commerce Clause, see Anne Havemann, Comment, Surviving the Com-
merce Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws with the Federal
Constitution, 71 MD. L. REV. 848, 851 (2012). See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n,
505 U.S. 88, 105 (1992) (“In assessing the impact of a state law on the federal scheme, we
have refused to rely solely on the legislature’s professed purpose and have looked as well
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• TransCanada’s suit against Massachusetts over dis-
crimination against out-of-state energy projects for
RPS RECs and renewable energy contracts, which
was partially settled in favor of the challengers;231
• California’s attempt to differentiate regulation of
out-of-state energy products based on the distance
they must travel and the greater carbon intensity
of electricity produced in the Midwest to produce
renewable energy fuel232 (separate from California
setting in-state wholesale tariffs);233
to the effects of the law.”); Energy Nuclear Vermont, L.L.C. v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 393
(2d Cir. 2013); Norris v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989).
231 Complaint at 1, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-cv-40070-FDS (D.
Mass. Apr. 16, 2010). In April 2010, Massachusetts was sued by TransCanada alleging
dormant Commerce Clause violations regarding requirements that state utilities enter
long-term contracts with in-state new renewable energy projects and that solar renewable
energy credits be earned only by in-state solar photovoltaic power projects, regardless of
where the power generation creating the RECs was sold. Id. TransCanada alleged that
Massachusetts ratepayers would be negatively impacted because they would be forced to
pay higher rates for only in-state renewable energy. Id. at 8. Massachusetts quickly settled
the suit and fundamentally changed its regulations. See Partial Settlement Agreement at
1–4, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd., No. 4:10-cv-40070-FDS, available at http://www.mass
.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/solar/settlement-agreement.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y24B-4MZE].
232 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1080–81 (E.D. Cal.
2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2013). The trial court reiterated that only the federal government can regulate commerce
between the states, and California, attempting to regulate commerce outside its borders,
violated exclusive federal authority to regulate interstate commerce. Id. at 1088–90.
California gave less value to the identical energy fuel, ethanol, when produced in the
Midwest, because of the latter region’s use of coal-fired power for electricity to produce
ethanol and other products and the longer transportation distance for trucks to transport
ethanol from there to California. Id. While such discrimination did reflect the total embedded
energy emissions and transportation costs of different means to produce the energy prod-
ucts and to move them to market from geographically distant production sources, the court
held that states cannot elect to discriminate against more-distant out-of-state products.
Id. The trial court again distinguished motive from constitutional requirements, holding,
“Although [the state’s] goal to combat global warming may be ‘legitimate,’ . . . it cannot ‘be
achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating the State from the national economy.’ ” Id.
at 1088S89 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1978)). As
noted by the Supreme Court, “While a State may seek lower prices for its consumers, it
may not insist that producers or consumers in other States surrender whatever competi-
tive advantages they may possess.” Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521
(1935) (holding that one state “has no power to project its legislation into [another state]
by regulating the price to be paid in that state for [products] acquired there”).
233 Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047, 20 (2010).
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• Vermont’s attempt to discriminate against the sale
of cheaper interstate power that could be sold other-
wise outside of its origin in Vermont;234
• The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declared un-
constitutional a state regulation limiting state re-
newable portfolio standards to in-state generation
as a violation of the Commerce Clause;235
• A 2013 decision of the federal court in Minnesota
holding clearly unconstitutional a Minnesota statute
which banned the import of foreign coal or new facil-
ity coal-produced power into Minnesota for power
generation or the construction of new plants which
would burn coal from out of state, prohibited any
new power purchase agreements for power produced
by out-of-state coal-burning plants, and raised the
cost of future purchases of coal power by assigning
environmental costs to use of the fuel.236
234 Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 236 (D. Vt. 2012)
(reasoning that “states are ‘without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade
from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they are required
to satisfy local demands or because they are needed by the people of the State’ ” and
holding that the state’s regulation in question was a “ ‘protectionist regulation’ violating
the Commerce Clause” (quoting New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331,
338S39 (1982))), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013). The trial court
found the regulation unconstitutional and issued an injunction “enjoin[ing] Defendants
from conditioning Vermont Yankee’s continued operation on the existence of a below-
market PPA with Vermont utilities.” Id. at 239. The Second Circuit did not disagree with
the substantive decision on the dormant Commerce Clause but procedurally held that
this issue was not yet ripe for review until Plaintiffs actually entered into such a forced
PPA with the state. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, 733 F.3d at 433–34.
235 Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t trips over an
insurmountable constitutional objection. Michigan cannot, without violating the Commerce
Clause of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy.”).
Michigan actually initiated the issue of in-state electric power discrimination in its RPS
program as a demonstration that out-of-state power transmitted to it was not recognized
as of the same value as in-state electricity and therefore Michigan should not pay a share
of power line tariffs transmitting power from out of state that did not have equal recogni-
tion and benefit. Id. at 775. Instead of supporting its position, this assertion caused Judge
Posner to respond, even though the tariff issue was not before the Court. Id. at 776. As
authority for its holding on the respective jurisdiction of state and federal government
to regulate electricity, the opinion relied on precedent and a 2012 law review article on
constitutional energy issues authored by Professor Ferrey. Id.
236 North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 891 (D. Minn. 2014). Exemptions were
made for the proposed Excelsior Energy integrated gasification combined cycle (“IGCC”)
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In the last-bulleted Minnesota matter above, the Supreme Court
held that “[s]uch a scenario is ‘just the kind of competing and interlock-
ing local economic regulation that the Commerce Clause was meant to
preclude.’ ”237 “[A]ny attempt directly to asset extraterritorial jurisdiction
over persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the inher-
ent limits of State’s power.”238 The Minnesota court treated electricity dis-
tinctly from other energy sources, which it is both in terms of its physics
and its status in American law.239
2. State System Benefit Charges
A system benefits charge (“SBC”) is a per-kWh power surcharge
imposed on all retail electricity consumers within a state utility’s service
territory through monthly utility bills, which creates an additional state-
controlled or state-administered energy fund.240 These state renewable
trust funds distribute money to subsidize various renewable energy re-
source projects and technologies pursuant to state legislation.241 Approxi-
mately one-third of U.S. states have enacted SBC and “public benefit
funds,” including seventeen states plus the District of Columbia.242
Between 1998 and 2012, approximately $3.5 billion was collected
by 14 states with existing renewable system benefit charges to endow
energy trust funds.243 More than half the amount collected, at least $135
plant in northern Minnesota, the Big Stone II coal plant in South Dakota, and the Maple
Grove–based Great River Energy’s Spiritwood Station plant in North Dakota. MINN. STAT.
§ 216B.1694, subd. 1 (2008); 2009 Minn. PUC LEXIS 6; 2010 Minn. PUC LEXIS 458; 2007
MINN. LAWS Ch. 136, art. 5 § 3; MINN. STAT., § 216H.03, subd.7.
237 Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989).
238 Id. at n.13 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982)). North Dakota and rep-
resentatives of its coal industry also sued Minnesota on Article VI grounds alleging the stat-
ute imposes Constitutional violations when it affects the wholesale price and transmission
of power within exclusive federal authority regarding wholesale electricity pricing, which
the court did not need to reach, having already found the statute unconstitutional. Id.
239 Steven Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe: Thermodynamics, Mass
and Energy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1839, 1903 (2004); FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT
POWER, supra note 33, at 2-8 to 2-9; FERREY, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35,
at 568.
240 Public Benefits Funds for Renewables, DATABASE FOR STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEW-
ABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/ [http://perma.cc/3WWF-ZK5N].
241 Id.
242 ELIZABETH DORIS ET AL., STATE OF THE STATES 2009: RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
AND THE ROLE OF POLICY 65 (2009), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46667.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2U3S-PBDQ].
243 MARK BOLINGER & RYAN WISER, THE IMPACT OF STATE CLEAN ENERGY FUND SUPPORT
FOR UTILITY-SCALE RENEWABLE PROJECTS, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE (2006),
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million/year, comes from just California. As of 2006, U.S. states’ energy
trust funds had committed almost $400 million to support 2249 MW of
renewable energy capacity.244 Most energy trust funds only provide assis-
tance to new projects, and not existing renewable projects. The funding
levels of these state charges on electric distribution range from $0.07/mWh
in Wisconsin up to almost $0.6/mWh in Massachusetts.245 The mean value
is about 0.1 cents/kWh of consumption.246
The created funds range in size from less than $1 million to greater
than $300 million per year.247 A number of these states, either explicitly
or as a matter of practice, will only fund sustainable energy projects within
their own states, even though power from all sources inside and outside
the state are taxed to create the SBC fund.248
A state’s primary interest with a system benefits charge is to sup-
port the in-state renewable energy industry and economic development.249
Therefore, it is likely that a state will want to retain the funds collected
from an SBC program to subsidize or provide incentive for in-state indus-
tries and development.250 The Illinois legislature decided its program would
“develop[ ] new renewable energy resources and clean coal technologies
for use in Illinois [for distributing these funds]” and “[t]he criteria should
promote the goal of fostering investment in and the development and use,
in Illinois, of renewable energy resources.”251 However, the effectuation of
the desire to retain subsidy funds for in-state benefit raises the dormant
Commerce Clause constitutional issue of discriminating against commerce
in out-of-state electricity.252 No litigation on this issue has occurred.
available at https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/CASE%20STUDY%20lbnl-56422.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NEU7-TBXX].
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 MARTIN KUSHLER ET AL., FIVE YEARS IN: AN EXAMINATION OF THE FIRST HALF-DECADE
OF PUBLIC BENEFIT ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES (Apr. 2004).
247 State Clean Energy Funds Fact Sheet, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/chp/policies/funds_fs
.html [http://perma.cc/NZ3Z-SLPD] (last updated April 2009).
248 Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environ-
mental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 295 (1999).
249 Id.
250 Id. (explaining the possible desire for states to retain system benefits charge funds
within the state).
251 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 6-3(b) (2008) (emphasis added); see also id. § 6-4(b).
252 See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, Follow the Money! Article I and Article VI Constitutional
Barriers to Renewable Energy in the U.S. Future, 17 VA. J. L. & TECH. 89, 130 (2012);
Steven Ferrey, Constitutional Barriers Confronting State Renewable Energy Programs,
ABA ENERGY COMM. NEWSLETTER (June 2006); Steven Ferrey, Renewable Orphans:
Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level, 19 ELEC. J. 52, 52 (2006).
2015] RING-FENCING THE POWER ENVELOPE 41
3. State Climate Control
In the absence of federal climate change legislation in the United
States, originally ten, and now nine, eastern states have combined into the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) to regulate carbon dioxide
(“CO2”) emitted from their larger power plants.
253 Additionally, California
has begun comprehensive regulation of all greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) from
all sources,254 and other western255 and midwestern256 states initiated—
but since postponed or abandoned—global warming gas regulation.
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative257 and California’s A.B.
32 carbon regulation program258 both adopted ‘cap-and-trade’ programs.
RGGI in originally ten, and now nine, eastern states, regulates its ‘cap-
and-trade’ allowances only for CO2 emissions from power plants larger
than 25 MW.259 California’s A.B. 32 regulates all carbon emissions from all
major industries in the state.260 RGGI is more limited than California in
covered entities and industries, the kinds of GHGs emissions controlled,
253 See RGGI, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/rggi [http://perma
.cc/UTF8-BQ7H] (listing participating states). New Jersey recently withdrew, and other
states have considered withdrawal from this cap-and-trade program. Angela Delli Santi
& Beth DeFalco, New Jersey Withdrawing from Regional Greenhouse Gas Program, CBS
CONN., http://connecticut.cbslocal.com/2011/05/26/42273 [http://perma.cc/K4QA-BRMH].
254 Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 38500–38599 (Deering 2010). The California carbon
scheme requires that California reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, consid-
ering all in-state and out-of-state generation used to serve California electric load. Id.
§ 38550.
255 The Western Climate Initiative is a group of seven western states and four Canadian
provinces that planned to release a carbon restriction program to cut GHG emissions 15%
below 2005 levels. History, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.westernclimateinitiative
.org/history [http://perma.cc/383A-P45R] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015). Six of the seven states
withdrew in 2011, “leaving California alone in this now-unitary consortium, along with
the four observing Canadian provinces.” FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra
note 33, at § 6:9. Nothing was accomplished in its four years of existence. Id.
256 The three states of Indiana, Ohio, and South Dakota opted out of this scheme and are
now observers. Nora Macaluso, Midwest States to Commence Work on Details of Regional
Climate Strategy, BNA ENVTL. REP., Nov. 30, 2007, at 2556; Dean Scott, Midwestern
States to Draw Up Model Rule By End of 2008 to Implement Cap-and-Trade, BNA ENVTL.
REP., Feb. 22, 2008, at 343.
257 RGGI, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.rggi.org/docs
/mou_12_20_05.pdf [http://perma.cc/5V6E-XCCK].
258 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501.
259 REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, GOALS, PROPOSED TASKS, SHORT-TERM ACTION
ITEMS 1 (2003), http://www.rggi.org/docs/actionplanfinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/LM97-P3PW].
260 See Assembly Bill 32 Overview, CAL. AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32
.htm [http://perma.cc/56GD-JL5D].
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and the amount of emissions targeted and controlled: RGGI controls just
CO2 while California controls all six GHGs; RGGI controls just larger
electric generation facilities while California controls, in three phases,
electric generation and all other larger industrial emitters of GHGs, in-
cluding transportation fuels. Both RGGI and California carbon credits
are tradable.261
A major practical and policy problem identified by California262 is
so-called “leakage” into the state of less-costly power whose carbon content
is not regulated or affected.263 Laws that attempt to arrest leakage by regu-
lating the conduct of out-of-state businesses also violate the Commerce
Clause.264 These laws can assume the form of added taxes and charges
on out-of-state goods.265 States are prohibited from attaching restrictions
to any goods that they import from other states: “States and localities may
not attach restrictions to . . . imports in order to control commerce in other
States.”266 States cannot regulate in ways where the practical effect is to
control conduct in other states.267
Where a state statute provided a tax exemption for sales of two
types of wine, both produced from products produced in the state, even
though not needing to mention the state by name, the effect was practi-
cally state-specific discrimination, and it was found to be discriminatory,
and a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.268 A state cannot reg-
ulate to favor, or require use of, its own in-state energy resources even
for a small percentage of total use,269 nor can it, by regulation, harbor
261 GOALS, PROPOSED TASKS, AND SHORT-TERM ACTION ITEMS, supra note 259, at 1.
262 CAP AND TRADE SUBGROUP, CAL. CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM
DESIGN OPTIONS 8, http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/reports/2006
report/2006-03-27_CAP_AND_TRADE.PDF [http://perma.cc/FJE9-N4V9].
263 See RGGI EMISSIONS LEAKAGE MULTI-STATE STAFF WORKING GROUP, POTENTIAL
EMISSIONS LEAKAGE AND RGGI: EVALUATING MARKET DYNAMICS, MONITORING OPTIONS
AND POSSIBLE MITIGATION MECHANISMS ES-1 (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.rggi.org/docs/il
_report_final_3_14_07.pdf [http://perma.cc/9P9D-89QN]; 2006 Gross System Electricity
Production, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://energyalmanac.ca.gov/electricity/system_power
/2006_gross_system_power.html [http://perma.cc/B5SQ-NB4U] (showing California imports
approximately 10% of its total electricity from out of state coal plants).
264 See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326–27, 343 (striking requirement that the
price of beer was not higher than that charged out-of-state).
265 See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336–37 (1992) (invalidating
an Alabama law imposing an extra fee on imported hazardous waste).
266 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994).
267 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336; C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393.
268 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). See also C & A Carbone, 511 U.S.
at 383.
269 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–56 (1992). The Oklahoma statute overturned
involved only a 10% allocation of the market to in-state producers. As a result of the
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energy-related resources originating in the state.270 In-state fuels cannot
be required to be used by a state even for the rationale to satisfy federal
Clean Air Act requirements.271 Income tax credits cannot be given by a
state only to in-state producers of fuel additives.272 The Supreme Court
consistently has required that the regulation of power by the states must
not discriminate regarding the origin of power or the ultimate impact
which may discourage its flow in interstate commerce273:
[We] consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution precludes a state from mandating that its
residents be given a preferred right of access, over out of
state consumers, to natural resources located within its
borders or to the products derived therefrom. [A] State is
without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade
from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the
ground that they are required to satisfy local demands or
because they are needed by the people of the State.274
Recent federal court opinions construing state electric regulation have
scrupulously followed this doctrine:
[S]tates are without power to prevent privately owned ar-
ticles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate
commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy
local demands or because they are needed by the people of
the State. . . [a] ‘protectionist regulation’ violating the Com-
merce Clause (quoting New England Power, at 338–39].275
Most recently, Judge Richard Posner, for the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in a unanimous decision, affirmed the Federal Energy
statute, the market changed in response from use of almost all out-of-state coal to “the
utilities purchased [in-state] Oklahoma coal in amounts ranging from 3.4% to 7.4% of
their annual needs, with a necessarily corresponding reduction in purchases of Wyoming
coal.” See also Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
270 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982).
271 Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 596–97 (7th Cir. 1995).
272 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 278–80 (1988).
273 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (overturning as a vio-
lation of the dormant Commerce Clause an order of the state Public Utilities Commission
that restrained within the state for the financial advantage of in-state ratepayers, renew-
able power produced within the state).
274 Id.
275 Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, slip op. at 83–84.
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Regulatory Commission’s approval of the Midwest Independent Service
Operator’s (“MISO”)276 proportionate customer utility allocation of trans-
mission costs for high-voltage transmission lines to move renewable wind
power to populated areas.277 To provide the foundation of its holding on
the respective jurisdiction of state and federal government to regulate
electricity, the opinion relied on a law review article authored by Professor
Ferrey.278 The decision, in dicta, declared unconstitutional a state limiting
state renewable portfolio standards to in-state generation, as a violation
of the Commerce Clause: “it trips over an insurmountable constitutional
objection. Michigan cannot, without violating the commerce clause of
Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable
energy.”279 Justice Scalia, concurring in the majority prior opinion in West
Lynn Creamery, submitted that, “subsidies for in-state industry . . . would
clearly be invalid under any formulation of the Court’s guiding principle”
for “dormant” Commerce Clause cases.280
Regarding these five types of cross-subsidies in the foundation of
the new energy model:
• FiTs have been struck as illegal/unconstitutional
when implemented in the 48 contiguous continen-
tal U.S. states engaged in interstate commerce in
power;281
• Renewable portfolio standards are unconstitutional
if employed discriminatorily, as in some states, and
276 MISO’s service area extends from the Canadian border, east to Michigan and parts of
Indiana, south to northern Missouri, and west to eastern areas of Montana. Locations,
MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/AboutUs/Locations/Pages/Locations.aspx [https://perma
.cc/FS6F-WWBY].
277 Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013). MISO
allocated the costs of the transmission projects among all of the utilities who draw power
from the MISO grid in proportion to each utilities’ overall volume of usage; FERC approved
MISO’s rate design, which led some states to initiate court appeal.
278 Id. (citing to article by Professor Steven Ferrey).
279 Id. at 776. Michigan actually initiated the issue of in-state electric power discrimination
in its RPS program as a demonstration that out-of-state power was not recognized as the
same value as in-state electricity, therefore Michigan should not pay a share of power
line tariffs transmitting power from out of state that did not have equal recognition and
benefit. Instead of supporting its position, this assertion caused Judge Posner to respond
to this assertion, even though it was not the tariff issue before the Court. Id.
280 West Lynn Creamery, Inc., 512 U.S. 186, 208 (Scalia, J., concurring).
281 Order on Petitions for Declaratory Order, Cal. Public Utils. Comm’n et al., 132 FERC
¶ 61047 (2010).
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in mid-2013 were declared by the federal Court of
Appeals to be unconstitutional if applying only to
in-state renewable power;282
• System benefit charges, as implemented in some
states, are at least de jure Constitutionally ques-
tionable on the face of some state statutes;283
• A recent federal adjudicatory order casts some doubt
on the expansive legal scope of net metering;284
• Carbon regulation had at least one state withdraw
participation due to a perceived lack of benefit given
the cost imposed on power consumers.285
Federal courts in 2013, including the Supreme Court,286 the federal
circuit courts of appeals,287 federal trial courts,288 plus FERC,289 confronted
seven specific federal cases alleging states in regulating energy violated
the Supremacy Clause and/or the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
At either the trial or appellate court levels, the states have lost each of
these on a significant legal constitutional claim by the petitioners.290 Of
note, state losses on constitutional grounds result in challengers’ attorney
fees being shifted to state taxpayers.291 Where states have prevailed, it is
282 Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013).
283 See supra Part III.B.2.
284 In re Sun Edison, 129 FERC ¶ 61,146, 18 (Nov. 19, 2009).
285 Santi & DeFalco, supra note 253.
286 E.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096 (2013); City of
Arlington v. Federal Commc’n Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
287 E.g., Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013); Ill.
Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013); Rocky
Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
288 E.g., Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 233 (D. Vt.
2012); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1099 (E.D.
Cal. 2011); PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp.2d 790 (D. Md. 2013), aff’d,
753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014) (field preemption and conflict preemption on wholesale power
prices); PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D. N.J. 2013), aff’d, PPL
Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (field preemption on wholesale
power prices and rates).
289 E.g., FERC Order on Petitions for Declaratory Order, In re Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,
132 FERC P 61047, 61337–38 (2010).
290 See supra note 281.
291 In the New Jersey case, the plaintiffs were allowed to submit an application for the
state to cover their legal fees. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 2011WL5007972, No. 3:11-
CV-00745-PGS-DEA (D.N.J. 2011). Scheduling Order, entered Oct. 18, 2013. Similarly
in the Maryland case and the Entergy case, application for attorneys’ fees were granted.
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often by raising procedural defenses of standing, ripeness, redressability,
concreteness, mootness or justiciability, to avoid having to defend their
statutes on the substantive legal merits.292 There also have been chal-
lenges to state energy regulation lodged under state administrative law:
• California, in 2011, lost a suit on its carbon control
cap-and-trade regulation resulting in an additional
year of delay in the program until 2013 while it
made revisions.293
• There was a successful suit in 2009 against New
York’s RGGI carbon control regulation affecting
electric power generation facilities.294
• An additional suit against New York’s partici-
pation in RGGI was deflected only by procedural
defenses.295
PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp.2d 372(D. N.J. 2013); Entergy Nuclear Vt.
Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 233 (D. Vt. 2012).
292 See generally supra note 291.
293 Tentative Statement of Decision, Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd.,
No. CPF-09-509562 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2011); Lisa Weinzimer & Geoffrey Craig, Delaying
California CHG Cap-and-Trade Regime a Year Draws Support from Stakeholders, ELEC.
UTIL. WK. (July 2011) at 11–12. The court issued a writ of mandate enjoining the California
Air Resources Board from any further cap-and-trade rule making until it has complied
with the California Environmental Quality Act by analyzing alternatives to cap-and-
trade and public comments. Joshua T. Bledsoe, California Cap and Trade Back on Track,
but Compliance Obligations Pushed from 2012 to 2013, LATHAM’S CLEAN ENERGY L.
REP.,http://www.cleanenergylawreport.com/environmental-and-approvals/california-cap
-and-trade-back-on-track-but-compliance-obligations-pushed-from-2012-to-2013/ [http://
perma.cc/LP46-TKG3] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015). This delayed the plan until 2013. Id.
294 See Indeck Energy Sues State Questioning Legality of Regional Greenhouse Gas Program,
CLEAN TECHNOLOGY BUSINESS REVIEW, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.cleantechnology-business
-review.com/news/indeck_energy_sues_state_questioning_legality_of_regional_greenhouse
_gas_program_090129 [http://perma.cc/YND4-FG9L] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015). See also
Vicki Shiah, Settlement Reached in Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Lawsuit, SPR
ENVTL. L. BLOG (Jan. 14, 2010, 2:28 PM), http://www.sprlaw.com/settlement-reached-in
-regional-greenhouse-gas-initiative-lawsuit/ [http://perma.cc/V7W-7YR4]. New York’s quick
settlement had Consolidated Edison Company agreeing to pay the cogeneration project
for the cost of its additional carbon allowances through the end of their preexisting long-
term contracts. See Consent Decree, Indeck Corinth, L.P. v. David Paterson, No. 5280-09,
at 5–6 (Sup. Ct. NY Cnty. Albany Dec. 17, 2009).
295 Thrun v. Cuomo 42 ELR 20132, No. 4358-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012); Geoffrey Craig &
Gail Roberts, Lawsuit Disputes Legality of New York Participation in RGGI, Citing Lack
of Legislative Approval, ELEC. UTIL. WK., July 4, 2011, at 10.
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IV. LEGAL ROOM TO MANEUVER WITHIN THE FORCE FIELD
A. The Force Field
The electromagnetic force is one of the four known primary forces
in the universe. The so-called weak force and the electromagnetic force
are united in quantum field theory, and both are associated with ripples
in the fabric of space-time.296 Electric circuits are the physical means for
conveying energy within a force field.297 Current is the rate of flow of elec-
tric charge from one point to another.298 As the charged particles move
within a cielrcuit, electrical potential energy is transferred from a source
to a device in which that energy is stored or converted into another form
or work.299
Electricity is identical in every U.S. state at every moment: It is an
energy field transmitted as alternating current at 60 Hertz and cycles per
second.300 What is delivered and sold is electric potential, through access
to the electric field.301 While its voltage is transformed at different points
on different lines, its critical status and movement are constant in every
state, in every transaction, and at every moment.302 For the last century,
electricity has not changed as a uniform thing in American commerce.303
296 BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE 197 (1999).
297 HUGH D. YOUNG & ROGER A. FREEDMAN, UNIVERSITY PHYSICS 799 (9th ed. 1996).
298 Id. We measure electricity as energy transferred per unit time. The usual unit of energy
is the kilowatt hour (“kWh”), which is a kilowatt for an hour. One kilowatt is 1,000 watts
per second. A watt is a joule per second. So a kilowatt hour is 3,600,000 joules. One kWh
is 1,000 watts for an hour. Id.
299 Id. at 799–800. When a conductor, such as copper or aluminum wire, is not energized
by a generator and is at rest, negatively charged electrons in the copper atoms are free
to move randomly in all directions thermally in the conductor, in close orbit around their
nuclei, similar to molecules in a gas moving in random motion. Because the motion of the
electrons is random, there is not a net flow of charge in any direction inside the copper
wire. When an electric field is applied to the copper wire by a power generation facility,
controlled moving charges become current in a wire. Id. at 800.
300 The electricity in the world is transmitted via alternating current, where the current
changes direction of flow either fifty or sixty times per second. See World Electricity
Standards, http://www.quantumbalancing.com/worldelectricity/electricityif.htm.
301 MAGED E.A. MOHAMED & AYMAN H. AMER EISSA, Pulsed Electric Fields for Food
Processing Technology, in STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF FOOD ENGINEERING 296 (2012),
available at http://cdn.intechopen.com/pdfs-wm/38363.pdf [http://perma.cc/3EU7-B59Q].
302 See World Electricity Standards, supra note 300.
303 For a history of electric power, see FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra note 10, at Appendix
A. Until the early 20th century, electricity was supplied at different voltages ranging from
100–600 volts and 40–133 cycles per second, by different suppliers. For the past century,
it is standardized throughout the United States at a set frequency of alternating current.
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It is still the energized electrical-magnetic force transmitted in a nation-
wide transmission and distribution system.
In 2012, wind energy was the most deployed new U.S. electricity
generation source of generation capacity, contributing 43% of all new elec-
tric generation capacity.304 The U.S. Energy Information Administration
projects that U.S. wind power capacity will total more than 77 GW at the
end of 2015, constituting 4.6% of total U.S. electricity generation.305 The
U.S. Department of Energy calculated that approximately 20% wind power
as a part of the system can be accommodated on the grid, which is equiv-
alent to the amount of back-up reserve margin maintained in regional
power systems, without requiring additional storage or other mechanisms
to accommodate intermittency of wind power generation.306
New intermittent wind and solar renewable resources cannot supply
reliable base load power, as they demonstrate a relatively low availability
factor in the 10–40% range of hours during a week, month, or year.307 Wind
generators have plant effective capacity factors of 20–30%.
B. Stability, Missing Links, Storage
Lack of storage of electricity is the critical missing link. Unlike all
other forms of energy, the moving electrons cannot be efficiently stored
as electricity for more than a second before they are lost as waste heat.308
Consequently, the supply of electricity must match the demand for elec-
tricity over the centralized utility grid on an instantaneous, constant, real-
time and ongoing basis, or else the electric system shuts down or expensive
equipment is damaged.309 Either too much or too little power causes system
instability on a second-by-second basis.310
304 Energy Dept. Reports: U.S. Wind Energy Production and Manufacturing Reaches Rec-
ord Heights, DEP’T OF ENERGY (Aug. 6, 2013), http://energy.gov/articles/energy-dept
-reports-us-wind-energy-production-and-manufacturing-reaches-record-highs [http://perma
.cc/D5T6-FVJA].
305 See Annual Energy Outlook 2015, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,http://www.eia.gov/forecasts
/aeo/ [http://perma.cc/3C3Y-637L].
306 J. DeCesaro et al., Wind Energy and Power System Operations: A Review of Wind Inte-
gration Studies to Date, 22 ELEC. J. 34, 34 (2009). Wind, being at off-peak times in many
locations, will tend to displace typical coal baseload power, while solar PV units will tend
to displace typical on-peak gas-fired peaking generation units. Id.
307 See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 33, § 10:101 (noting inability of
intermittent sources to serve as baseload resource).
308 FERREY, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 568.
309 CRO FORUM, supra note 36, at 4; see FERREY, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note
35, at 568.
310 CRO FORUM, supra note 36, at 3.1.2.
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We do not have any means to store electricity per se. As a substi-
tute, we convert electricity either into chemical energy in batteries, into
stored physical energy as potential compressed air or greater elevated
reservoir capacity in hydroelectric pumped storage facilities, into active
physical energy in flywheel movement, or into thermal storage as heat.311
Electricity itself is not stored in any of these forms. Pumped hydro storage
constitutes 95% of the storage utilized in the United States, and dominates
how we store electric energy potential worldwide. See Figure 4.312
Figure 4: Rated Power of U.S. Grid Storage Projects (includes
announced projects)
Battery storage has emerged as the key link for integrating more
deployment of intermittent sources of renewable energy such as solar and
wind. Lithium-ion and lead-acid batteries may or may not change electric
technology in the near future by providing economic storage of intermittent
power, although the storage costs are still quite high.313 The recent bank-
ruptcies of American battery makers such as A123 Systems and Ener1 over
recent years, have caused uncertainty on economic battery development.314
 
311 See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 33, at § 2.21.
312 DEP’T OF ENERGY, GRID ENERGY STORAGE 11 (Dec. 2013), available at http://energy.gov
/sites/prod/files/2014/09/f18/Grid%20Energy%20Storage%20December%202013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/MD45-ZU9U].
313 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 34 (“Prices for lithium-ion batteries are projected
to fall from $700/kWh in 2013 to $300/kWh in 2020–2025.”).
314 See Bill Vlasic & Matthew L. Wald, Maker of Batteries Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/business/battery-maker-a123-systems
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Research at Stanford University calculated that the amount of
energy required to create a large ground-mounted solar generation facility
is comparable to the energy used to build each of five different battery
technologies: “Using batteries to store solar power during periods of low
demand would, therefore, be energetically favorable.”315 However, for wind
farms, while curtailing wind power reduces the return on wind investment
by 10 percent, storing surplus wind-generated electricity in batteries results
in even greater reductions on investment return, from about 20 percent
for lithium-ion batteries to more than 50 percent for lead-acid batteries:
Ideally, the energetic cost of curtailing a resource should
at least equal the amount of energy it cost to store it. . . .
That’s the case for photovoltaics, but for wind farms, the
energetic cost of curtailment is much lower than for battery
storage. Therefore, it would actually be more energetically
efficient to shut down a wind turbine than to store the sur-
plus electricity it generates.316
There are still carbon emissions associated with the manufacture of
wind and solar energy capital components.317 As the number of distributed
-files-for-bankruptcy.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/AL3C-8TNV]; Phil Milford & Dawn McCarty
, Ener1, Battery Maker, Seeks Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection, BUS. WK. (Feb. 8, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-08/ener1-battery-maker-seeks-chapter-11
-bankruptcy-protection.html [http://perma.cc/AH8N-D58C]; Michael Bathon, Wanxiang
Wins U.S. Approval to Buy Battery Maker A123, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-29/wanxiang-wins-cfius-approval-to-buy-bankrupt-battery
-maker-a123.html [http://perma.cc/9SB7-JUUS] A123, for instance, ended up in Chinese
hands when Wanxiang Group bought the battery maker at a bankruptcy auction. Todd
Woody, California launches first “battery university” to push energy storage technology,
QUARTZ (Apr. 22, 2013), http://qz.com/77045/california-launches-first-battery-university
-to-push-energy-storage-technology [http://perma.cc/MFS2-MQTH]. California is trying
to take the lead in battery research at a time when China is also working hard on it. Id.
315 Mark Shwartz, Stanford scientists calculate the energy required to store wind and solar
power on the grid, STANFORD UNIV. (Sept. 9, 2013), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2013
/september/curtail-energy-storage-090913.html [http://perma.cc/PH6R-FGPA] (according
to Charles J. Barnhart, lead author of the study, “[p]umped hydro storage of water is used
in almost all electricity grid storage, with an energy return on investment 10 times better
than conventional batteries.”).
316 Id.
317 Photovoltaics require much more aluminum for panel frames and other components than
other technologies do, and alloys for wind turbines demand large amounts of nickel, pro-
duced by high-energy extracting and refining processes, which tend to emit large amounts
of carbon. John Matson, Renewable Energy’s Hidden Costs: Low-carbon power depends
on climate-unfriendly metals, SCI. AM., Sep. 17, 2013, http://www.scientificamerican.com
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grid-connected solar facilities has increased, the magnitude and frequency
of voltage fluctuations become more of a problem, increasing maintenance
costs and earlier replacement of certain components.318 When solar PV
output into distribution lines exceeds the instantaneous load on that line,
power back-flows between the low-voltage and medium-voltage lines,
causing reliability problems.319 In the most solarized of all U.S. states,
Hawaii, solar PV units in certain Hawaiian areas are back-feeding power
into their interconnected circuits, causing circuit voltage increases and
other power quality issues and problems.320
Grid management is projected to be able to handle up to 30% re-
newables penetration.321 There can be grid stability issues caused when PV
facility inverters trip off because of grid voltage or frequency fluctuations.322
Even at 20% wind penetration in a grid, there could be a 33–50% decline
in the running of combined cycle fossil-fuel generation units, and it is
unclear whether these units could run profitably at these reduced operat-
ing levels, or would exit the market.323
Because the U.S. grid is served primarily by coal-fired units, they
are one significant source which might be asked to operate more in a
cycling mode.324 Coal-fired units typically are large because of coal being
a less dense fossil fuel, and must operate at no less than 45–50% of their
/article/renewable-energys-hidden-costs/ [http://perma.cc/52TC-WBMA]. Large solar instal-
lations take one to seven years to break even with coal power on carbon emissions, while
wind farms take one to twelve years to break even. Id.
318 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 53.
319 Id. at 53–54.
320 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 52. Advanced inverters can provide support to net-
work stability. Upgrading inverters can also help. Germany has required that inverters
on an estimated 315,000 PV systems be retrofitted in an effort to improve electricity system
reliability and prevent potential instability issues. Id.
321 See PJM, Executive Summary of Renewable Integration Study for PJM, http://www
.pjm.com/~/media/committees-groups/committees/mic/20140303/20140303-pris-pjm-cover
-letter.ashx [http://perma.cc/DKL9-FDKK] (last accessed Aug. 30, 2015).
322 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28. The current international standard for inverters is
IEEE 1547, and some states, such as Massachusetts, are pushing further ahead. See id.
Instability mitigation measures could include grid reinforcement, installation of onload
tap changers, advanced voltage control for HV/MW transformers, installing static volt
ampere reactive (“VAR”) control, or installing a booster transformer. Id. at 55–56. Advanced
PV inverters can provide low-voltage ride-through capabilities with frequency control or
dynamic reactive support. Id. at 58.
323 J. Nicolas Puga, The Importance of Combined Cycle Generating Plants in Integrating
Large Levels of Wind Power Generation, 23 ELEC. J. 33, 34 (2010), http://www.bateswhite
.com/media/pnc/4/media.344.pdf [http://perma.cc/EWS6-9YZK].
324 Id.
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design capacities.325 If coal-fired power plants are forced to cycle on and
off more, it will result in significantly higher operation and maintenance
expenses; increased heat rate, which is a proxy for inefficiency; increased
start-up costs; and a shorter life of the unit.326 One analysis of coal-plant
cycling against intermittent renewable power’s hourly variations found
that emissions during cycling were eight percent higher for sulfur dioxide
and ten percent higher for nitrogen oxides than emissions of the same
compounds during constant operation.327
Moreover, in a more intermittent distributed renewable energy
system, while fossil-fuel generators are asked to spin to increase their
temperatures to their design values, the power that these units produce
may or may not be effectively used by the grid, thus incurring power
“uplift” costs to the grid.328 While the more modern coal plants have the
ability to ramp up and down more flexibly than older units, they do not
have the flexibility to mimic the real-time variability to match fluctua-
tions in wind power availability to keep the grid constantly supplied.329
Even though more able to cycle variably up and down than coal
plants, natural gas combined cycle turbine facilities, which can be modi-
fied to increase by up to 50% their minimum necessary start-up times to
accommodate pressure and temperature transients of their steam turbines
and readiness of their heat recovery steam generators, may still not have
enough flexibility to be able to follow the more extreme intermittency as-
sociated with greater renewable power supply in the grid.330 Even if able
to be adapted to operate in a cycling role, gas combined cycle units will
experience higher heat rates, less efficient operation, and greater mainte-
nance and unavailability.331 European data illustrates that since the regu-
lation of CO2 emissions, there has been a shift from traditional coal unit
operation to more operation of gas combined cycle units, which resulted
in an increase in these units’ O&M costs, outages, and less availability.332
325 Id. at 37.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 38.
328 Id. at 37.
329 Puga, supra note 323, at 37.
330 Id. at 38.
331 Id.
332 W. Edward Platt & Richard B. Jones, The Impact of Carbon Trading on Performance:
What Europe’s Experience Can Teach North American Generators, POWER (Jan. 2010),
http://www.powermag.com/the-impact-of-carbon-trading-on-performance-what-europes
-experience-can-teach-north-american-generators/?printmode=1 [http://perma.cc/NU26
-9S6T].
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Grid modifications, upgraded circuits and transformers, and ex-
pansion of the transmission and distribution infrastructure, are neces-
sary to integrate more use of intermittent renewables, but not otherwise
required at anywhere near this degree if intermittent new resources were
not so prominent in the supply inventory.333 In Germany, this already
resulted in an additional €1 billion of cost, with tens of billions more of
investment required.334 In addition, there is a need for more installation
on the system of more quick-start ramping or spinning generation reserves
to respond to the constant intermittency of solar and wind generation and
provide load-following generation.335 This is a large and often uncalculated
cost, only necessary because of the switch to intermittent generation as a
larger component of grid supply.
Interconnection costs include both the direct costs to physically con-
nect a new distributed PV system to the grid, as well as the cost to upgrade
the grid to accommodate the extra distributed generation injected into
the grid.336 Some countries require that PV generators be responsible for
all of these costs, while some countries allocate the cost of grid upgrades
to all ratepayers.337 If this is a cost of the interconnection of new and dis-
tinct generating technology, American legal precedent dictates that these
costs be borne by the generator.338 This was not an issue traditionally, as
virtually all power generation was provided by monopoly utilities in each
geographic region.339 Whether the generation business side of the utility
paid for this expense, or it was socialized as an expense of the transmis-
sion and distribution side of the same utility, the resulting cost to con-
sumers was not affected: 100% of the approved costs were passed on to
the utility’s rate-paying customers.340
All of this changes in the new business model. Most generation for
the past several years has been constructed by independent power com-
panies (“IPPs”), rather than the utilities.341 Interconnection-related costs
for larger distributed PV systems in Massachusetts, based on the author’s
333 Davies & Allen, supra note 127, at 1002.
334 Id. at n. 419.
335 Puga, supra note 323, at 34.
336 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 67.
337 Id. at 52–53.
338 18 C.F.R. § 292.306; FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 33, at § 4:35.
339 FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra note 10, at 260–66.
340 16 U.S.C. § 824(d); FERREY, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 582–83.
341 See Sheldon Silver & Paul Tonko, The Electric Industry in New York, Section II(C),
http://assembly.state.ny.us/Reports/Energy/199710/#III.%20FACTORS%20AF [http://perma
.cc/BY6Z-BBX7].
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confidential information, have ranged from $25,000–$4,500,000 for small
2–6 Mw systems.342
Added costs for more system spinning reserves and quick-start
power to integrate intermittent power into a grid without compromising
gird reliability,343 has not yet been passed on to the generators whose new
intermittent projects cause incursion of these added costs, but rather are
socialized to all customers of the utility as part of electric T & D system
costs. All states still allocate these T & D costs not by a fixed fee per cus-
tomer, but based on the traditional volume of each customer’s electricity
consumption.344 By supplying power for their own self-use and therefore
purchasing a much lower amount of power from the grid, new distributed
generators in the new model can avoid what would otherwise be their a
priori proportionate volumetric share of the cross-subsidy paid to them
and others for system modification and additional ancillary and spinning
reserve requirements they impose on the grid.345
V. ECONOMICS, LAW, CIRCUMVENTION
A. A Critical Legal Variable: In Front of the Meter or Behind It?
It is not just utilities that could lose revenue in this new distrib-
uted generation model. State government receives a significant benefit
from invisible taxes embedded in the typical utility bill, as well as local
government property tax on utility poles and wires, whose value could be
decreased as a lesser amount of power is metered over it. A significant per-
centage of the residential retail bill is government taxes: 40% in Germany346
and up to 25% for some utilities in New York.347 See Table 1. Regulated
utility companies pay taxes based on net income and on gross receipts.348
342 For small PV projects, as the costs gets in to six figures, it becomes significant. Infor-
mation is confidential with project owners, but known by the author through his advising
renewable energy projects.
343 See Puga, supra note 323, at 24.
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 24.
347 Silver & Tonko, supra note 341, at § III, Table 3.
348 MARILYN M. RUBIN, A GUIDE TO NEW YORK STATE TAXES i, vii (2011), http://pjsc
.magikcms.com/Tax%20guides/StateGuideWeb.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z9JE-LVSG]. Regu-
lated utility companies pay taxes based on net income and on gross receipts. Taxes im-
posed on utilities include the 9A Corporate franchise Tax, the Gross Receipts Tax and the
Sales/Use Tax. There also can be local taxes including business income/gross receipts
taxes, sales taxes and property taxes. Id.
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As self-generation and competition absorb more power creation and supply
behind the meter or through net-metering transactions which run the
retail meter in reverse, the utility retail meters will register lower gross
receipts, and state taxes will decline commensurately.
TABLE 1: ELECTRIC UTILITY COST STRUCTURE AND TAXES IN NEW YORK,
1994 (CENTS/KWH)349
LILCO
Con
Edison
Orange &
Rockland
NYSEG RG&E NIMO
Central
Hudson
1992
US
Aver-
age
Fuel and
Purchased
Energy
3.18 3.11 2.75 2.37 1.10 3.23 2.17 2.38
Wage &
Benefits
1.28 1.98 1.32 0.83 1.41 1.67 1.07 0.81
Opera-
tions
1.56 1.58 1.15 1.07 1.66 0.78 1.28 0.78
Taxes 3.07 3.46 1.63 1.43 2.00 1.21 1.62 0.96
Capital 6.05 3.24 1.67 2.31 2.75 1.61 2.02 2.13
TOTAL 15.14 13.36 8.53 8.01 8.92 8.50 8.16 7.06
In contrast to whether the generation is in front of or behind the re-
tail meter, if the utility, rather than distributed generators, owns the re-
newable units, all of the power still passes through the retail meter, gross
receipts are unaffected, and state and local tax amounts don’t change. The
meter is everything; position matters. Arizona Public Service (“APS”) in
late July 2014 filed with the Arizona Corporation Commission a plan
called AZ Sun DG, under which APS would lease conventionally con-
sumer rooftops for its own PV generation purposes.350 Under a 20-year
conventional lease, APS would pay homeowners $30/month (set off as a bill
billing credit) for use of the roof to install and own 20 MW of solar photo-
electric systems on 3,000 customer homes.351 APS would incur itself the
349 Silver & Tonko, supra note 341, Section III, Table 3.
350 Bruce W. Radford, Rent the Rooftop, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, http://pjsc.magikcms
.com/Tax%20guides/StateGuideWeb.pdf (Aug. 2014), available at http://www.fortnightly
.com/fortnightly/2014/08/rent-rooftop [http://perma.cc/69CF-RF92].
351 Id.
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capital, installation, and maintenance costs, estimated at $57–$70 mil-
lion for 3,000 homes each with a 4–8 Kw system, or $19,000–$24,350 per
home ($3,000–$5,000/Kw installed).352
The placement of the solar unit does not change. The PV unit
wiring to either the front or back side of the retail meter is all that sig-
nificantly changes. The key legal distinction is that these would not be dis-
tributed generation: they would be on the ‘front’ utility side of the meter
at grade in the dwelling. Therefore, the power would be metered as any
other utility-owned generation project delivered by the utility, but situated
on land and the home roof structure owned by the customer rather than
the utility. The meter is the message: on which side of the meter one inter-
connects the AC power generation inverters is critical. APS would own
both the PV panels and the power output of them until the power reached
the meter and is transacted at the regulated retail rate.353
This slight change in wiring generates the same amount of PV
power. It is a means to accelerate use of solar, but not to accelerate deploy-
ment of distributed generation on the customer side of the meter. Traveling
the same distance from the home roof to the home electrical panel inter-
connection, the utility would assess the same distribution charges as if the
power traveled through several towns to arrive. With this arrangement,
these PV customers pay conventional power distribution rates for use of
the system. Ken Johnson, at Solar Energy Industries Association, reacted:
In a move condemned by many solar companies in Arizona,
the state’s largest utility, APS, has announced that it will
begin installing rooftop solar on customers’ homes . . . this
move would stack the deck in favor of a company which can
rate base solar with a guaranteed rate of return. How is
that fair? The Arizona Corporation Commission needs to
think this through very carefully.354
This wiring to the front side of the utility meter established firm
legal lines: the residential customer would receive $360/year in rent, or
more than $7,000 over twenty years, for outlaying no capital, taking no
risk, not altering electric service provision, and having a ‘solar home.’ If
352 Id.
353 Id. This differs from the so-called “Buy All, Sell All” business model where the utility
buys the customer-owned output at the lower wholesale rate and sells back the power to
customers at the higher retail rate, thus still collecting and payment for transmission and
distribution. Id.
354 Id.
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there is any central utility service disruption during peak daytime hours,
depending on precisely how the solar output is wired, the customer could
be insulated from a central service disruption by still receiving service
from the rooftop array. It is a formula which is roughly equivalent to an
approximately 50% reduction in the cost of electric service.
With a median size 5–6 Kw PV rooftop array, with a 15–20% PV
capacity factor APS might generate something in the general range of
8000 kWh/year of electricity, which would have a wholesale retail value
of approximately $400/year, and a retail value of more than twice that
amount. The host consumer cuts its electricity costs roughly in half as a
result of the lease payment, with no or little capital risk, the utility gen-
erates power worth more than its out-of-pocket capital and operational
cost, and the utility is able to realize retail transmission and distribution
charges associated with all power produced. State and local utility tax
revenues are not affected, and the state realizes a policy goal of reducing
criteria pollution and carbon emissions, while promoting residential solar.
The issue here, though, is not so much as to whether it is a viable
solar PV promotional mechanism, but whether it undercuts expansion of
on-site distributed generation, and whether it distorts the solar industry
or competition in the state. It is argued that the grid operator has clear
incentives to favor increasing the utility’s assets rather than to encourage
customer-owned distributed energy resources.355 And some critics argue
that “it is imperative that we separate grid operation from grid ownership
and delegate operation to” an independent distribution system operator.356
There is also a question about this business model as to whether
a utility should place on-site distributed generation in its rate base and
earn a return on equipment it installs on the customers’ residences. The
traditional precedents of utility rate-making have never incorporated a
litmus test as to whether utility-owned generation is on leased or owned
property. The test has always been whether the investment is “just and
reasonable”357 and “prudent”358 for utility generation of power. Where
355 Farrokh Rahimi & Sasan Mokhtari, From ISO to DSO, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY,
June 2014, at 42, available at http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2014/06/iso-dso [http://
perma.cc/4VDG-SYQD]; Tong & Wellinghoff, supra note 92.
356 Id.
357 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a), (e) (2012); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487
U.S. 354, 374 (1988) (“FERC has properly exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and
reasonable wholesale rates or to insure that agreements affecting wholesale rates are
reasonable.”); Town of Norwood v. FERC, 80 F.3d 526, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Entergy
Nuclear Vt. Yankee, L.L.C., 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 233 (D. Vt. 2012).
358 Midwestern Gas Transm. Co., 36 F.P.C. 61, 70 (1966), aff’d sub nom. Midwestern Gas
Transm. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 388 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1968); Re Bos. Edison Co., 46
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there is a state solar policy to encourage renewable power generation,
and where customers are willing to have solar on their roofs—but do not
want to or can’t make the large capital investment for the expensive solar
unit—and where the lease transaction is voluntary and arm’s length, there
is no a priori reason why it would violate regulatory law. However, it is a
policy and competitive issue regarding whether energy regulatory com-
missions will allow certain types of utility business involvement on cus-
tomer sites.
B. Benefits, Costs, Legal Conflicts
When combined with power sale revenues, the total value of solar
PV benefits have been estimated in one estimate to be higher than the
levelized cost to install PV (e.g., $0.15–$0.41/kWh in the U.S.).359 If that
estimate proves true, PV system owners actually now cross-subsidize
other ratepayers, and subsidies for PV owners should be increased.360 As
with any significant social change for important infrastructure, there will
be winners and losers. And it is a role of government to both manage some
of this change, and look at the equities and the cost justification of that
change. With utilities, the last of the regulated industries,361 there is the
ability for government to manage this change.
At present, there are few models for a transition to new business
models. Meister’s report concluded that there need to be supportive policy
and regulatory conditions to foster this revolution, which are within the
control of regulators.362 Principal among these are the ability to intercon-
nect to feed in electricity to the grid and the ability to get credit for excess
power produced and not consumed through net metering, during times
when residential PV output does not always match the time at which power
is consumed on site.363 The amount of self-use of distributed generation is
a critical driver to capture the full value of distributed system output.364
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 438 (Mass. Dep’t Pub. Utils. 1982), enforced sub nom. Att’y
Gen. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 455 N.E.2d 414 (Mass. 1983); Norwood, 80 F.3d at 531.
359 LENA HANSEN ET AL., A REVIEW OF SOLAR PV BENEFIT & COST STUDIES 13–18 (2nd ed.
2013); RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 31 (citing Richard Perez et al., Solar power
generation in the US: Too expensive, or a bargain?, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 7290, 7298 (2011)).
360 BIRD ET AL., REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXPANDED ADOPTION
OF DISTRIBUTED SOLAR 6 (2013); RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 43.
361 FERREY, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 582.
362 RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 5.
363 Id. at 6.
364 Id. at 26.
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The foci of subsidy have been net energy metering, employed in
86% of the states, and renewable portfolio standards, employed in 60%
of the states.365 If not carefully designed based on quantitative data, both
of these state policies could cause the conventionally served customer un-
knowingly to cross-subsidize net metering and RPS customers or vice
versa. The costs of these cross-subsidies are not transparently revealed
on the customers’ bills.366 FiTs are unconstitutional when adopted by U.S.
states for their regulated investor-owned utilities,367 and net metering368
and RPS,369 as applied, have attracted constitutional scrutiny.
As a quick calculation, the typical national cost to the utility to pur-
chase RECs is approximately a 40% increase in cost of the value of the
wholesale power itself (not the total cost of retail bundled cost including
taxes).370 For a utility in Massachusetts, the REC purchase price was re-
cently approximately 120% the wholesale cost of the power itself.371 With
solar RECs, in some states, they are averaging a value 500% over the value
of the power in terms of the cost to utilities to purchase solar RECs.372 The
ACP penalty price to the utility of not complying with solar REC require-
ments in some states is + 1000% the value of the power involved.373
National Grid estimated the cost of $3.95/month per residential
customer to compensate for the Massachusetts RPS program, expected to
rise by $1/month by 2015.374 National Grid estimated that net-metering
cost will more than double between summer 2013 and the end of the year
($0.09/month to $0.23/Month), and then more than triple again by the end
of 2014 ($0.93/month).375 $4.04/month is the cost of the two green Massa-
chusetts energy mandates, which represents 5.4% of the typical National
Grid customer’s monthly bill of $74.38/month, not including the state
365 See supra Parts III.A.2 & III.B.1.
366 See NSTAR monthly bill (on file with author).
367 See supra Part III.A.1.
368 See supra Part III.A.2.
369 See supra Part III.B.1.
370 Author’s calculation assuming a trading price of $15–20 for a state REC.
371 Author’s calculation, assuming $60/REC selling price, with wholesale power being trans-
acted in ISO-NE at approximately an average price of $50/mWh.
372 Author’s calculations with Massachusetts solar RECs selling in the $220–500/mWh
SREC trading range.
373 Author’s calculation, comparing an ACP of $550/mWh SREC in Massachusetts with
the $50/mWh average price of power.
374 Bruce Mohl, Green energy costs raising concerns, COMMONWEALTH MAG., Aug. 8, 2013,
http://commonwealthmagazine.org/environment/004-green-energy-costs-raising-concerns/
[http://perma.cc/XVH8-M59E].
375 Id.
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energy efficiency system benefit charges which cost the typical customer
another $4.70 a month.376 Thus, more than 12% of the customers’ bill is
for renewable energy and energy conservation subsidies—and rising—
which indicates the slope of the trend line on net-metering costs on indi-
vidual bills. Utilities in California estimate that net metering may mean
as much as $1.4 billion a year in lost revenue, that will have to be added
to the bills of non-net-metering customers.377
Some citizen groups, governors and other elected officials have
begun to highlight cross-subsidies from all electric consumers to designated
recipients possibly occurring through these state policies.378 The Presi-
dent of NRG Energy noted that more distributed solar and wind power
is forcing utilities to spread their increasing fixed grid costs over fewer
customers, increasing the cost of service to non-exiting conventional
customers.379 In more than two-thirds of the states there is no alternative
for retail power consumers other than purchase from the utility’s monopoly
supply including any invisible additional costs associated with state in-
centive mechanisms.380
The funds for subsidy costs do not come out of thin air, or from
state government. In the U.S. electric power regulatory model, the costs
of state wholesale power generation incentives are not absorbed by the
utilities, but are passed on to its retail customer ratepayers. And that con-
flict is now manifest between those who give and receive subsidies.
Idaho moved in 2013 to adjust the amount net-metering facilities in
the state are paid in order to lessen electric company/ratepayer impacts.381
This increases customer demand charges in the distribution rates and com-
mensurately decreasing retail energy rates, with the intent to even out
rates paid by participating and non-participating net-metering customers,
and alleviate the burden on their customers.382 Virginia introduced legis-
lation to allow Dominion Virginia Power to collect a standby charge from
customers with net metered systems larger than 10 kW.383 There have been
376 Id.
377 Diane Cardwell, On Rooftops, a Rival for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2013, at B1.
378 See supra Part II.C.2.
379 Andrew Engblom, NRG CEO: Distributed Generation a ‘Mortal Threat’ to Utilities, SNL
ENERGY, Mar. 22, 2013 (copy available with author).
380 See RESA, State-By-State, RETAIL ENERGY SUPPLY ASS’N, http://www.resausa.org/states
[http://perma.cc/TM97-LMX5] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (showing that thirty-six states
still maintain monopolies on the sale of electric power).
381 Order of Notice of Schedule, Case No. IPC-E-12-27 (Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm’n 2013).
382 Id.
383 Net-metering, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://
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proposals on net metered tariff changes in Arizona and Georgia.384 Arizona
in late 2013 imposed an additional fee of approximately $4.90/month on
solar installations to cover base grid access costs.385
San Diego Gas & Electric Company alleged that net metering pro-
vided an “unfair and unsustainable subsidy” of approximately $34 from
each other customer to net-metering customers.386 The California Public
Utility Commission reported that by 2020 net-metering subsidy could cost
nonsolar electricity customers $370 million–$1.1 billion per year.387 It doc-
umented that most homeowners with distributed solar systems had an
average household income about twice that of the average household.388
California preserved net metering, but directed the state’s Public Utility
Commission to devise a new program by 2017 that ensures nonsolar cus-
tomers do not bear an unfair burden.389 Satisfying the California goal of
having 33% of electricity supplied by renewable resources by 2020 re-
quires, in an estimation by the California PUC, the expenditure of ap-
proximately $115 billion.390
The Wall Street Journal reported in 2013 that 14 of the 29 states
that have RPS systems considered proposals in the first 6 months of 2013
to lessen or repeal the mandates.391 In 2014, Ohio became the first state to
freeze its RPS program, negating the annual legislated increase in RPS
requirements for two years.392 The RPS requirement remained, but did not
programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/40 [http://perma.cc/5BPS-FB2U] (last visited
Oct. 26, 2015).
384 See Standby & Fixed Cost Charges And Net Energy Metering Debates: Current Status,
N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. (August 2014), http://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/wp-content
/uploads/State-Status-of-NEM-Standby-+-Fixed-Cost-Charge-Debates_V2.pdf [http://perma
.cc/84SR-SWZX].
385 Id. Arizona Public Service originally sought an amount ten times this amount. Id.
386 Lisa Weinzimer, Consumer and Solar Groups Pan SDG&E’s Planned Surcharge, Saying
It May Be Illegal, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Nov. 21, 2011, at 18.
387 Than, supra note 1.
388 Id.
389 Id.
390 Lisa Weinzimer & Lynn Corum, California Challenge looks bigger and bigger among
Economic Woes, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Jan. 18, 2010, at 1, 20.
391 Ryan Tracy, Green-Energy Mandates Find Improbable Allies, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2013,
at A-5. The Wall Street Journal article did not identify which states were involved, although
this represents about half of the RPS states. Id. It would include Ohio, Michigan, Kansas,
Missouri, North Carolina, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Maryland, and Wisconsin.
In addition to Ohio, New Hampshire and New Jersey have had unsuccessful pressure for
change brought as in North Carolina, Kansas, Texas, Colorado, and Connecticut.
392 Tom Knox, The freeze is on—Kasich signs S.B. 310, halts renewable and energy-efficiency
standards, COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST (June 13, 2014), http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus
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advance as originally legislated. This did not repeal the Ohio RPS pro-
gram, but retarded its inclining curve of greater renewable energy credit
purchase by utilities for two years.
VI. MOVING FORWARD
The utility model is changing, and no one is yet sure where it will
go. There must be a new model of cost allocation and recovery as the utility
role changes, which one observer notes could include393:
• monthly infrastructure fees from solar users, as
some are now doing (to compensate for a base
amount of grid benefit afforded)
• itemized a la carte components of value separately
and disaggregate which customers consume which
features
• split energy used and consumed into separate trans-
actions so that all DG energy is sold to a utility be-
fore buying back what’s needed (as is done with
gross net metering)
In 2014, the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Edison
Electric Industry, an electric utility industry trade group, jointly called for
a new state retail rate structure to reflect more equitable prices, based
on actual costs and benefits, for distributed renewable energy systems.394
The groups jointly stated that “[r]ate designs will continue to develop that
/news/2014/06/13/the-freeze-is-on-kasich-signs-s-b-310-halts.html [http://perma.cc/XX7N
-YCZN]. In June 2014, Ohio enacted Senate Bill 310 to freeze for two years renewable
energy and energy efficiency cross-subsidies, making Ohio the first state to back off its
RPS. Id. As a result, Ohio’s renewable energy mandate will remain at 2.5% and its energy
efficiency standard at 4.2% compared to 2009 levels for the next two years. Id. A legis-
lative committee will review the standards enacted in 2008, which provide that 25% of
the electricity sold by Ohio utilities must be generated from alternative energy sources.
Id. Half of that must come from renewables like wind power, solar must account for at
least 0.5% of the renewables load, and utilities must slash customers’ power usage by
22% in the same time frame. Id.
393 Lehr, supra note 55, at 35.
394 EEI/NRDC Joint Statement To State Utility Regulators, NRDC (Feb. 12, 2014), http://
docs.nrdc.org/energy/files/ene_14021101a.pdf [http://perma.cc/9YLL-2XAK]; Christopher
Martin, NRDC and U.S. Utilities Urge Grid Payments for Solar, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY
AND CLIMATE REPORT (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-12
/nrdc-and-u-s-utilities-seek-compensation-for-rooftop-solar-cost [http://perma.cc/Z4ZW-JAE4].
2015] RING-FENCING THE POWER ENVELOPE 63
reward customers for using electricity more efficiently,” and an NRDC
official stated that owners of rooftop solar panels “must provide reason-
able cost-based compensation for the utility services they use.”395
Change is in the air in the first state. In 2014, Minnesota decided
to take a more active step in navigating the minefield of renewable energy
production. The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission decided to create
a value-for-solar formula to determine the value of consumer-generated
solar energy.396 Under the Commission’s mandate, utilities may adopt the
value-for-solar formula on a volunteer basis. Up until this finds some form
of implementation, Minnesota and 42 other states currently require the
utility to pay the retail rate for excess power generated by consumers’ net
metered generator.397 One commissioner was concerned that this formula
would create a subsidy for individuals who use solar energy while increas-
ing the rate for those who do not.398
States are now just beginning to respond to what is an imperative
for a system when all allocated regulated amounts in tariffs are based on
actual costs of service. If implemented appropriately, the ring-fences of
RPS, net metering, and other state techniques, all of which segregate sub-
sidies between customers, can be employed by the states without the cur-
rent legal controversy. Moving forward, a quantitative determination of
cost/benefit is the future route to satisfy legal and economic foundations
for subsidies.
395 Id.
396 DSIRE, Wind and Solar Electric (PV) Systems Exemption, DATABASE OF STATE INCEN-
TIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail
/151 [http://perma.cc/MLA4-RMTE] (last updated Mar. 26, 2015). The Commission con-
sidered the value of consumer-generated renewable energy to the utility, to ratepayers,
to society, and to the environment. Id. The Commission used a federally determined value
for the cost of a carbon footprint. Id.
397 Id.
398 Id.
